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The Barents-cooperation, a multilateral cross-border collaboration including Norway and 
Russia, currently finds itself surrounded by an increased geopolitical tension. Recent years 
have seen a deteriorating relationship between the West and Russia, especially after the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014. The increased tension has also impacted the Norwegian-
Russian relationship. In 2015, the Norwegian defense minister at the time Ine Eriksen Søreide 
acknowledged that increased geopolitical tension between the West and Russia had become 
the ‘new normal’. Yet, the Barents-cooperation has sustained its cross-border activity.  
In this thesis, I analyze interviews I have conducted with practitioners in the Barents-
cooperation. In context of their interaction with Russia, I explore how they experience the 
geopolitical tensions that surrounds the cooperation. I conduct this exploration by applying a 
discourse theoretical approach. This allows me to analyze how the practitioners link 
geopolitical tension to the Barents-cooperation, what tensions are experienced, and how they 
reflect on themselves, other relevant actors, and possible challenges to the cooperation. I 
highlight empirical observations emerging from the interviews and find that practitioners in 
the Barents-cooperation use political tensions to articulate and revive justifications for the 
collaboration. The informants represent the Barents-cooperation as an increasingly important 
facilitator for dialogue between Norway and Russia – constructing it as a counterweight to 
interstate tensions. As the informants reflect upon political events and developments in recent 
years, my analysis reveals the politics of the Barents-cooperation and how it becomes a tool 
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Since its inception in 1993 the Barents-cooperation and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region – 
hereby the Barents-region – have been a part of Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia. 
Two of the Barents-cooperation’s outspoken goals has been to enhance stability and security 
between western allies and Russia in the region (Eriksson, 1995). Due to its institutional 
structure, including both an inter-governmental and an inter-regional level, and the coaction 
between the two, the cooperation is promoted as a unique type of international cooperation 
(Regjeringen, 2015). Here, collaboration is sought through cultural, educational and social 
projects, furthering trade, commerce and regional political cooperation. Paramount to the 
cooperation are the people living in the Barents-region, who take part in cross-border projects 
and participate in the regional institution-building. In this thesis, I refer to such activities as 
everyday foreign policy practices and to the people enacting them as practitioners. The 
cooperation also provides a platform for regional politicians, as well as foreign ministers and 
diplomats, to meet and engage in dialogue. In that sense, the Barents-cooperation has been an 
arena for constructive and cooperative everyday practice in a region that used to be highly 
militarized and of high tension during the Cold War.  
However, while in the early post-Cold War years there were signs of optimism and 
demilitarization, the previous decade saw the Russian-Western relationship grow increasingly 
contentious. NATO-enlargement and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and 
subsequent sanctions-regime stand out as the major developments contributing to increased 
tension between the former Cold War enemies. The Arctic region (which the Barents-region 
is part of) is simultaneously gaining increased international attention because of the melting 
polar ice cap, its vast natural resources, and geopolitical significance. Recent years have also 
seen an increased militarization in the Arctic region – for example made visible through major 
NATO-exercises or Russian expansion of military infrastructure (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 
2018). Moreover, events directly related to the bilateral relationship between Norway and 
Russia have unfolded, for example the arrest of Frode Berg convicted in Russia for spying on 
behalf of the Norwegian intelligence service. All of this considered, the Barents-cooperation 
finds itself situated in a part of the world where geopolitical tensions are back on the rise. It is 
these tensions surrounding the cooperation that is the entry point to my analysis of the 
Barents-cooperation in this thesis. 
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Despite a geopolitically turbulent decade, the cooperation has retained its cross-border project 
activity. Importantly, the Norwegian government has continued its support to the cooperation 
– both financially and rhetorically. The Norwegian foreign minister Ine Eriksen Søreide is 
adamant that the Barents-cooperation remains an important part of Norwegian foreign policy 
towards Russia:  
“The people-to-people cooperation undoubtedly means a lot for people in the north. 
But it also means a lot for Norway as a whole. The great activity is a positive force in 
our relationship with Russia. […] Here in Kirkenes, foreign policy quickly turns into 
local politics with concrete results and consequences – for better or worse. And in very 
few places are local politics as significant for foreign policy as they are here.” 
(Søreide, 2019) 
This quote demonstrates that the foreign minister acknowledges the Barents-cooperation as a 
special kind of foreign policy practice which is significant to Norway’s relationship to Russia. 
It is also an expression of how the local everyday practitioners are central to the 
implementation of this positive force in Norway’s foreign policy. It is therefore curious to 
notice a gap in the literature with regard to investigations of subjective viewpoints of local 
practitioners of that policy. One possible explanation for that could be the bias in foreign 
policy research and security analyses towards elite actors (Gjørv, p. 845). There is a divide in 
the field of IR between analyses of elite actors and non-elite actors, and between state-centric 
perspectives and perspectives focusing on a plurality of actors and agencies in IR. While 
traditional IR-theories, such as realism, continues to be centered on states, international 
political sociology, the practice-approach, and feminist IR theories have an actor-perspective 
that is more open and flexible regarding what actors, whether states, institutions, corporations, 
elites, NGOs or individuals, have power in regard to particular international political issues. 
Therefore, I argue that it is of political and academic relevance to explore how the local 
practitioners of the Barents-cooperation experience and interpret political tension, the current 
Norwegian Russia-policy, and its effects on the Barents-cooperation. Here, they are 
understood as foreign policy actors with a unique insight into an important pillar of 
Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia. In this thesis, I analyze twelve interviews I have 
conducted with practitioners of the cooperation. 
To analyze the interviews, I apply discourse analysis in order to study how the informants 
make sense of and link the Barents-cooperation the geopolitical tension in recent years. 
Central to my choice of discourse as analytical approach is the poststructuralist theorization of 
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foreign policy. I draw particularly on the work of Lene Hansen (2006), who emphasizes how 
articulations of foreign policies entails discursive legitimizations of the given policy. In my 
analysis, this is important as I draw attention to how the practitioners of the Barents-
cooperation reflect on the geopolitical tensions that in their view makes it challenging but all 
the more necessary to justify and legitimize their own foreign policy practice. The discourse 
theoretical perspective also draws attention to the construction of identities through the 
legitimization of foreign policies. Uncovering identities concerns the identification of ideas 
about the Self and the Other in the articulation of foreign policy and is then central to how 
policies are shaped (Hansen, 2006, p.6). Thus, in the discourse analysis of interviews with 
practitioners of the Barents-cooperation, I draw attention to how they link the cooperation to 
geopolitical tensions, assess their own role vis-à-vis other relevant actors, and construct 
threats and challenges. 
As geopolitical and interstate tensions in and around the Norwegian-Russian relationship is 
showing no signs of abating, it is likely to believe that new events and developments will 
continue to make its mark on the Barents-cooperation as well as Norwegian Russian relations 
in the future. This makes it relevant to reflect on how the people who make out this important 
pillar in Norwegian Russia-policy understand and represent themselves, other actors, and 
geopolitical tensions. Therefore, the research question is formulated as follows: 
• How is the Barents-cooperation discursively represented by its Norwegian 
practitioners, and what identities are thereby produced?  
 
1.1 Outline of the thesis 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two outlines the theoretical framework of the 
thesis. Building on poststructuralist IR-theory, the discourse theoretical foundation of the 
thesis is presented. Central to this chapter is establishing my actor-perspective and discourse 
theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis. Whereas the discourse theoretical foundation 
was laid in chapter two, in chapter three I discuss the methodological implications of 
conducting discourse analysis and how I have solved these. This chapter presents how I 
collected primary data through semi-structured interviews. Moreover, it aims to provide for a 
transparent research process and critical scrutiny by including reflections on validity and 
ethical considerations. Chapter four looks at the three trends in the Norwegian-Russian 
relationship that are important to understand the Barents-cooperation as Norwegian foreign 
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policy. In chapter five the discourse analysis of the interviews with the practitioners of the 
Barents-cooperation is conducted. Hence, this is where I seek to answer my research question. 
Drawing on the experiences articulated in the interviews, the chapter is divided into four 
subsections from which geopolitics is linked with the Barents-cooperation. Central to the 
analysis is how the informants represent the cooperation amidst geopolitical tension, how they 
legitimize the cooperation, construct identities, and where they identify potential threats and 
challenges to the cooperation. Finally, in chapter six I conclude this thesis by emphasizing 
and reflecting on the main analytical points from the preceding chapter.  
 
2 Foreign policy, actors, and discourse  
In this thesis I seek to explore how the practitioners of the Barents-cooperation give meaning 
to the cooperation, construct identities, and how these ideas and experiences can be situated 
within a wider Norwegian foreign policy field. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to 
present the conceptual lens through which I conduct this exploration. As I address the 
practitioners of the Barents-cooperation as foreign policy actors, I situate my approach within 
the actor-debate in IR. In doing so, I highlight contributions to IR literature that direct focus 
towards and establish the relevance of non-state and non-dominant actors to political issues. 
Moreover, I discuss my poststructuralist discourse theoretical approach to foreign policy 
analysis. The poststructuralist discourse theory provides me with the analytical tools to 
approach subjective viewpoints of the practitioners of the Barents-cooperation. Here, the way 
in which the poststructuralist approach theorizes the constitutive relationship between 
representations of identity and foreign policy is central.  
2.1 Foreign policy and conceptual debates in IR 
The ways in which foreign policy is studied differs within the theoretical spectrum of IR. 
Traditionally the field of IR has been occupied with states and the structures that shape their 
behavior. This follows especially from realist IR theories holding that the state is the principle 
actor in international politics. The state-centric view is backed up by a series of assumptions 
about international relations. One of those assumptions is that the state is a rational actor 
driven by self-interest in order to survive or to maximize its material power (Waltz, 1979; 
Mearsheimer, 2014; 2016). This follows from another assumption - that of a divide between 
the inside, the state, and the outside, the international realm. In this view, the inside is 
characterized as a place for order where progress is possible and the outside as a place of 
5 
 
anarchy in which no progress is possible (Neumann, 2019, p.49). From this division between 
inside and outside follows a separation between domestic policy as policies to reach goals in 
the ordered realm, and foreign policy as policies for reaching goals outside the ordered realm 
(Neumann, 2019, p.50). Foreign policy is then primarily understood in terms of ensuring that 
the order and progress within the state is secured against the anarchical and threatening 
outside. For a long while this dominant IR theory has been central to how foreign policy and 
security have been understood by scholars. Therefore, it is unsurprising that much of the 
literature on foreign policy and security has revolved around state-centric approaches.  
In this thesis, I approach the study of the Barents-cooperation with the practitioners of the 
cooperation at the crux of my analysis. The state-centric and materialist focus of the 
traditional approaches to the study of foreign policy is therefore insufficient to my study 
because it fails to consider other agencies than that of a unitary state. While the influence of 
realism and stat-centric theories remains strong, the field of IR has over the past decades been 
increasingly interested in other actors and agencies.  
For example, various perspectives and theoretical approaches that emerged from what is often 
called the fourth debate in IR during the 1980s and 1990s, has expanded the actor perspective 
within the field. The debate saw IR divided between positivists, such as realism, and post-
positivists branches. Some of the post-positivist approaches that arose from the 
metatheoretical debates in this period are constructivism, poststructuralism, feminist IR-
theories, critical theory, and international political sociology (Kurki & Wight, 2016). While 
these approaches differ in many ways, they are linked through their critique of positivist 
assumptions about international relations. The positivist philosophy of science is broad and 
not easily compartmentalized, however a common feature is its adherence to seeing “facts” 
through empirical observation (Kurki & Wight, 2016, p.21). Post-positivist approaches on the 
other hand, has a different epistemological starting point for studying foreign policy asserting 
that “accounts of the world are shaped by subjective preferences” (Hill, 2016, p.49). It follows 
from this post-positivist line of thought the relevance of subjective viewpoints and 
experiences to the study of international politics.  
In his book Concepts of International Relations (2019), Iver Neumann formulate an 
understanding of the study of foreign policy as:  
“the study of agents: what states do and how people within them think. It follows that 
IR studies relations not only as such but also as these relations are planned, executed 
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and experienced by the agents that are party to those relations. We call this the study 
of foreign policy” (Neumann, 2019, p.1). 
Thus, he argues that IR is not exclusively about the study of states and state-interaction. 
Rather, it is the study of the relations between all political units – which he terms 
polity/polities – and the thoughts and experiences of the people within these polities 
(Neumann, 2019, p.2). Neumann goes on to write that: “the key thing to note about the 
international is that it embraces not only state-to-state relations but also all other relations 
between agents that are based in different states” (2019, p.77). This relational perspective 
opens for a diversity of actors, as opposed to what the traditional approaches to IR allow for. 
The point is not to say that the state does not matter, rather it is to highlight how other 
agencies makes a difference and are relevant to foreign policy and international politics. It 
then becomes necessary to ask what actors are relevant, in terms of power and significance, 
within specific political issues – in the case of this thesis: the Barents-cooperation as part of 
Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia. Therefore, in the following subchapters I discuss 
IR-literature and theoretical approaches to foreign policy that open for a more diverse actor 
perspective. 
2.2 “Everyday” practitioners in foreign policy 
The Pierre Bourdieu inspired practice-turn and subfield of international political sociology 
that emerged in the early 2000s has provided an alternative actor-perspective within the field 
of IR (Montsion, 2018, p.9). This Bourdieu-inspired approach has been deployed to empirical 
research on different international relationships or potential security communities, such as for 
example Private Military Companies (PMCs) (Leander, 2005), NATO-EU (Græger, 2016) 
and NATO-Russia (Pouliot, 2007; 2010). Instead of the conventional focus on the unitary 
state-actor, the practice-turn is an analytical concept that directs attention towards the political 
practices that constitutes international politics and foreign policy, e.g. the practice of 
diplomacy. I use the actor-perspective of this practice-turn as an inspiration to my analytical 
inquiry into the contemporary experiences of the everyday practitioners of the Barents-
cooperation. 
A central contribution to international political sociology comes from Vincent Pouliot 
(2007;2010). The Frenchman approaches the constructivist concept of the security community 
as a type of community of practice. A security community understood as a ‘community of 
practice’ demands a focus on what the actors of the community do – “the concrete ways in 
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which state representatives handle disputes in and through practice” (Pouliot, 2010, p.5). This 
directs focus towards how security is produced through everyday practice. That way, Pouliot 
challenges the traditional conception of security as limited to the material sphere of military, 
defense, and the use of force. With Pouliot’s conception of communities of practice, he pays 
particular attention to the practitioners of such communities. In order to uncover subjective 
viewpoints and analyze the why the practitioners act the way they do, Pouliot opts to combine 
qualitative interviews with practitioners, participant observation and textual sources such as 
e.g. memoirs from meetings (Pouliot, 2010, p.66). Thus, he devotes empirical attention to the 
subjective viewpoints of the actors – or practitioners – of a given political community. While 
Pouliot primarily focus on policy-elites (e.g. state diplomats), approaching the study of a 
multilateral cooperation such as the Barents-cooperation with a focus on its everyday 
practitioners allows for an actor perspective that includes more than dominant actors such as 
e.g. diplomats. The everyday practitioners of the Barents-cooperation include everything from 
local people participating in cross-border projects, to people employed in the different 
institutions of the cooperation, as well as politicians. 
An important point of the Pouliot’s approach to practitioners of international relations is the 
concept of background knowledge. Central to understanding this concept is Bourdieu’s 
thinking tools of habitus and doxa. Referring to what actors think from, rather than what they 
think about, background knowledge is the inarticulate know-how that informs practices 
(Adler, 2008, p.202). Related to habitus, part of the background knowledge informing practice 
is the actors’ dispositions; past interactions and experiences (Pouliot, 2010, p.33). According 
to Pouliot this implies that practice is normally tacitly learned – e.g. ways of conducting 
diplomacy in a specific transnational relationship are picked up and reproduced by new 
generations of diplomats (2010, p.30). Furthermore, background knowledge pertains to doxa 
because its inarticulate character makes it appear self-evident (Pouliot, 2010, p.28). In other 
words, practice in this view becomes self-evident when its doing doesn’t follow any reflection 
over its consequences or appropriateness. Being aware of how certain assessments of relations 
and practices are made can therefore reveal underlying logics to how actors operate and 
perceive of their social world. In the analysis of this thesis I argue that the way the 
practitioners assess their relationship to Russia amid authoritative developments in the 
Russian state, is driven by an underlying logic, or background knowledge, that is not 
articulated explicitly, but that my analysis of the interviews with the practitioners reveals.  
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As such, Pouliot’s approach informs my actor-perspective in this thesis and his concept of 
background knowledge is relevant as I in the analysis point out an underlying logic within the 
Barents-cooperation. However, in terms of analyzing the experiences and representations of 
the everyday practitioners in the Barents-cooperation I draw on a poststructuralist discourse 
theoretical approach. Therefore, in this thesis I direct analytical attention towards the 
linguistic practices that constitutes our world and informs politics – as opposed to the subfield 
of international political sociology in which practice is conceptualized as primarily social 
action (Adler & Pouliot, 2011).  
2.3 Language as practice 
Emerged out of the fourth debate in IR, poststructuralism positions itself as a critical approach 
to social explanation. Poststructuralists challenges central assumptions and taken-for-granted 
perspectives of mainstream IR and has especially been engaged in critique of realism. A 
central feature of poststructuralist approaches has therefore been to analytically scrutinize 
how the state has come to be viewed upon as the most important actor in international politics 
(Campbell & Bleiker, 2016, p.199). As David Campbell and Roland Bleiker writes 
“Poststructuralism began with an ethical concern to include those who had been overlooked or 
excluded by the mainstream of IR” (2016, p.199). Accepting, without analytical scrutiny, the 
world as a system of states, the analyst neglects other possibilities and runs the risk of 
preserving the current state of affairs (Neumann, 2002, p.638). The poststructuralist approach 
to the position of the state is to analyze the “practices of statecraft” that made the state and its 
importance seem both natural and necessary (Campbell & Bleiker, 2016, p.199). Relevant in 
analyzing this is the concept of discourse, understood as “a specific series of representations 
and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations 
established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible” (Campbell & 
Bleiker, 2016, p.208). With regard to the role of the state in IR, the poststructuralist approach 
therefore analyses the discursive production of the role of the state. It follows from this that 
the poststructuralist discursive approach also attends to other agencies and the identification 
of their power.  
Embedded in the concern with language, discourse and meanings, a central notion of 
poststructuralism is that ‘everything is language’. This has led to a critique arguing that 
poststructuralism therefore rejects the existence of an external reality. However, as put by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985): “What is denied is not that . . . objects exist externally to thought, 
but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of 
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any discursive condition of emergence.” (as cited in Campbell, 1998, p.351). This is what 
separates the poststructuralist approach to that of e.g. constructivism which accepts a 
distinction between the ideational and the material. Hence, the interest in discourse does not 
reject the existence of a material world. Rather, by refusing the distinction between the 
discursive/non-discursive, poststructuralists engage in the interplay between the ideational 
and material (Campbell, 1998, p.352). Conceptualizing discourse as entailing both the 
ideational and the material, leads to an understanding of discourse as performative. 
Performative means that through discursive practices, the subjects and objects articulated are 
not only described, they are constituted (Campbell & Bleiker, 2016, p.209). Thus, in this view 
language is not mere utterance, it has “real world”-consequences.  
Lene Hansen is a pivotal researcher involved in contemporary debates on foreign policy, 
identity, discourse and poststructuralism in IR. In her book Security as Practice: Discourse 
Analysis and the Bosnian War she argues that language is a field of social and political 
practice (2006, p.18). Social in that language is a series of codes necessary for making oneself 
comprehensible, and political in that it is a site for production and reproduction of identities 
where some are included and others are excluded (Hansen, 2006, p.18). This idea makes it 
important to acknowledge the relationship between language and power. Because with the 
ability of discourses to include, exclude, enable and constrain, comes power. Embedded in the 
practice of exclusion and inclusion is the power to determine what is viewed as 
commonsensical and as such; accepted as knowledge (Neumann & Dunne, 2016). Hence, 
discourse analysis gives struggles over power analytical primacy (Neumann & Dunne, 2016, 
p.54). Adopting this approach can therefore make us attentive to what power relations the 
practitioners of the Barents-cooperation foreground in my interviews with them. In the 
analysis (chapter five), we shall see how power relations become especially apparent when 
the informants link a Norwegian center-periphery dynamic to the Norwegian government’s 
foreign policy practice in recent years.  
With interest in power structures and how discourses include and exclude, feminist IR 
theories have made essential contributions and been especially insightful in its 
reconceptualization of security, challenging the conventional notion of the state as a security-
provider (e.g Tickner, 1992). While there exists several approaches of feminist IR theory, 
asking different epistemological and ontological questions, they are bound by their interest in 
understanding women’s subordination (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2016, p.182). Concerned with 
how dichotomous linguistic constructions, e.g. strong/weak or rational/emotional, serve to 
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empower the masculine over the feminine, poststructuralist feminist IR theory deconstruct 
social hierarchies and bring marginalized experiences to the fore (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2016, 
p.185). In that way, feminist IR theory have provided important perspectives by attending to 
the political relevance and agency of non-dominant actors.  
While in my analysis I do not take gender dynamics into account, feminist IR theories are 
relevant as they are occupied with the everyday experiences of non-state and marginalized 
actors. Feminist approaches to IR argues that those in non-dominant positions have 
experiences that are relevant to understanding how power relations are produced and 
reproduced (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2016). Whereas the practitioners of the Barents-cooperation 
are not marginalized in the sense that feminist theories are concerned, their voices and 
experiences have been overlooked in literature on Norwegian foreign policy. Yet, as we shall 
see in chapter four, when the Barents-cooperation was formalized and made part of 
Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia, regional actors and institutions were made a central 
part of the policy. Therefore, by situating the practitioners of the Barents-cooperation at the 
center of my analysis, their opinions and everyday experiences are given the attention 
befitting their political relevance. 
As we have seen in this subchapter, understanding language as practice makes visible the 
political and constitutive nature of linguistic practices. It allows us to scrutinize the state as 
the unitary actor in international relations and makes us attentive to the construction of power 
relations in politics and society. Theorizing linguistic practices as constitutive of our social 
and political world, also informs how foreign policy is studied by poststructuralists – of which 
I go into greater detail now. 
2.4 Identity and foreign policy 
Occupied with the linguistic practices that constitutes our social world, poststructuralists 
argue that foreign policy should be understood as a discursive practice (Hansen, 2016, p.109). 
Hansen writes that “foreign policies need to ascribe meaning to the situation and to construct 
objects within it” (2006, p.6). Therefore, in articulations of foreign policies there is a 
discursive production of identities through which the particular policies are legitimized. Or 
more precisely, as we shall see, an idea that representations of identity and legitimization of 
foreign policies are in a constitutive relationship (Hansen, 2006, p.6). In this view, foreign 
policy is seen first and foremost as a practice that constitutes who “we” are, as opposed to the 
traditional understanding of foreign policy as policies aimed at achieving a set of goals 
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(Neumann, 2019, p.56). Identity construction is therefore a central part of poststructuralist 
understanding of foreign policy as a discursive practice. This is central to my analytical 
undertaking of the Barents-cooperation because by uncovering how identities are constructed, 
we gain insight into how the agents of polities assess and make sense of their own role vis-à-
vis other actors, and how foreign policy action is legitimized. The understanding of identity as 
relational has been deployed to develop poststructuralist approaches to the study of foreign 
policy as discursive and political practice (Campbell, 1992; 1998; Hansen, 2006).  
A landmark contribution to poststructuralist literature is made by David Campbell (1992; 
1998) and his analysis of state identity and foreign policy of the US. Campbell is occupied 
with foreign policy constructed in terms of security - security discourses - as he scrutinizes the 
state’s construction of dangers and threats, presented to and consumed by its citizens. Foreign 
policy articulated as security discourses is by Campbell seen as a political practice articulating 
and locating external threats and conveying these threats to the internal audience. For 
example, by articulating an external threat to one’s freedom, the internal is juxtaposed with 
the external, and the (internal) state’s identity as “free” is constructed. As such, the state’s 
identity is dependent on a demarcation of boundaries that separates the “inside” from the 
“outside” or “Self” from the “Other” – a demarcation articulated in policy (Campbell, 1998, 
p.352). Following this logic, the construction of one’s identity, idea of Self, is dependent on 
the construction of an Other; claiming that one political entity is weak is essential to the claim 
that another is powerful. Thus, objects are given meaning and identity in their difference to 
other objects. For example, in his article Russia's Europe, 1991–2016: inferiority to 
superiority (2016) Neumann shows how the idea of Europe historically has played a role as 
Russia’s constitutive Other. Meaning that in the discourse on Russia’s international standing 
and idea of Self as a “great power”, the European Other plays a central part. As we shall see 
in the analysis of the interviews in this thesis, the construction of the Russian state as 
authoritative and undemocratic, is central to my informants representation of the Self (the 
Barents-cooperation) as liberal and democratic.  
Hansen (2006) provides a thorough account of her poststructuralist theorization of the 
constitutive relationship between foreign policy discourses and identity. In Hansen’s words: 
“[…] identity is not something states, or other collectives, have independently of the 
discursive practices mobilized in presenting and implementing foreign policy” (2006, p.1). In 
this view, identities are not fixed or neutral accounts of what subjects or objects “really are”; 
they are social constructs produced and reproduced through the articulation of policies 
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(Hansen, 2006, p.xvii). It follows from this the possibility of multiple Selves and Others, 
meaning that the representation of Self is dependent on who the Other is. In the interviews 
with practitioners from the Barents-cooperation multiple Selves and Others are constructed. 
For example, they represent their idea of Self differently in relation to Russian civil society 
than what they do in relation to Norwegian central authorities – revealing different dynamics 
and ideas within the cooperation. Moreover, while simultaneously including and excluding, 
discourses enable and constrain action. Therefore, seeing foreign policies as a discursive 
practice also implies an understanding of foreign policy discourses as directions for action 
(Hansen, 2006, p.21). Political statements such as articulations of foreign policies are not 
mere rhetoric, they enable and constrain state action and interaction. As we shall see in 
chapter four, Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia and the changes it has gone through 
have come hand in hand with different representations of a Russian Other, legitimizing the 
policy. Similarly, in the analysis of this thesis (chapter five), I show how the discourse on the 
Barents-cooperation entails identity construction and legitimization of a specific type of 
cooperative foreign policy practice.  
Moreover, Hansen suggests to study what she terms “wider foreign policy fields” (2006, 
p.62). While official foreign policies are articulated and declared by heads of states and their 
foreign ministers, Hansen argues that official foreign policy discourses should be situated in a 
broader political field. This is becuase there might be competing discourses articulating 
opinions and ideas that are at odds or simply different from the official discourse (2006, p.61). 
This serves as a way of uncovering the different viewpoints and debates regarding a state’s 
foreign policy. Competing or non-dominant discourses are relevant because they do not exist 
in a vacuum. In fact, Hansen (2006) explains their relevance to official discourse as decision-
makers draw on a wider pool of opinions in their articulation of foreign policies. Competing 
discourses are a part of how identities and the legitimization of policies are unceasingly 
produced, reproduced, contested, and renegotiated. As Neumann notes, “Societal debates do 
not determine foreign policy moves, but the general tenor of policy debates has the effect of 
making certain moves easier to legitimate than others” (2016, p.1394). By looking beyond the 
scope of official state discourses, Hansen opens for the inclusion of alternative or non-
dominant voices and experiences to the study of foreign policy. It is within this ‘wider foreign 
policy field’ that the experiences and representations of the practitioners in the Barents-
cooperation is situated. In the following chapter, as I discuss how I developed my interview 
project and my methodological approach to the analysis their contemporary experiences.   
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3 Reflecting on methods: Interviewing and text analysis  
This chapter intends to clarify the methodological and practical steps of research undertaken 
in the study of the Barents-cooperation. With the intention of creating transparency and 
opening for critical consideration, I explain how I designed an interview-based project, how 
and why I prepared and conducted interviews with practitioners in the Barents-cooperation. 
As the method and theoretical framework in this thesis is in close interplay, this chapter draws 
on the discussions from the previous chapter where I introduced the discourse theoretical 
perspective that guides my study. I discuss the methodological implications of conducting a 
discourse analysis and how I solved them. This includes a discussion on the analysis of texts 
and how discourses and the construction of identities are interpreted and identified within 
them. Finally, I assess the quality of my data and address the issue of validity before the 
ethical considerations I have made along the way are accounted for. 
3.1 Data collection  
How did I approach gathering the data needed in order to answer my research questions? My 
interest in the Barents-cooperation and the politics surrounding it was from the outset geared 
towards the experiences of the people enacting the cooperation on an everyday basis. My idea 
was that these people could offer unique insights into how the geopolitical turmoil of the 
recent decade was experienced within the Barents-cooperation. Following Neumann (2002), 
that discourse analysis should be supplemented by data from the field, I therefore entered the 
field and collected my own interview data. This was done by going to Kirkenes from 11/02/20 
to 21/02/20, making contact with potential informants and designing a semi-structured 
interview guide. This enabled me to study the subjective viewpoints, experiences and 
subsequently uncover discourses within the Barents-cooperation.  
In the present thesis the practitioners working with the Barents cooperation from Norway is 
the area of study. The discourses studied and analyzed here is therefore limited to the 
Norwegian part of the Barents cooperation. Importantly, 10 out of 12 interviews are 
conducted with people living and operating from Kirkenes. I choice to go to Kirkenes because 
that is where some of the core institutions of the cooperation are located – such as the 
Norwegian Barents Secretariat and the International Barents Secretariat. Kirkenes is also the 
location of several festivals and conferences related to the Barents-cooperation. For example, 
during my stay in Kirkenes the annual culture festival the Barents-Spektakel was underway. 
Due to its proximity and shared history with Russia, Kirkenes also has a symbolic role in the 
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cooperation. It is where the Norwegian and Russian foreign ministers meet to symbolically 
mark the anniversaries of the Soviet liberation of Northern Norway during world war two.  
In order to identify informants and conduct interviews, I applied a combination of purposive 
sampling and snowballing. Purposive sampling is an approach where identification of 
informants is made in reference to the research question (Bryman, 2016, p.410). In addition, 
the purposive sampling followed a sequential approach, meaning that the sampling evolved 
and changed as the research went along (Bryman, 2016, p.410). Upon going to Kirkenes I had 
sent emails to potential informants, informed about my arrival and research project, and 
requested and planned interviews. At the end of each interview I asked if the informant could 
think of someone that it would be interesting and relevant for me to talk to. Applying 
snowball sampling that way was especially useful as it allowed me to benefit from the 
informants contact networks and knowledge of the Barents-cooperation. Four of the 
interviews I conducted, including three local experts within various fields in the Barents-
cooperation, and one expert from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, followed this sampling 
strategy.  
Moreover, because the cooperation consists of a vast array of branches, I have interviewed 12 
people with special expertise and practical experience from the Barents-cooperation. The 
informants are local experts, including consultants working in the Norwegian Barents 
Secretariat in Kirkenes, for the northern Norwegian regions in the EU, and journalists 
reporting on cross-border developments, as well as ministerial expertise located in Oslo, and 
the mayor of Sør-Varanger. Thus, the informants represent a broad variety of experiences and 
insights from the cooperation. While I could always have included more, these 12 informants 
represent a broad selection in terms of their expertise and experience in and around the 
Barents-cooperation. 
Out of the 12 interviews, 7 were conducted face-to-face during my fieldtrip to Kirkenes, one 
face-to-face in Oslo, three over Skype, and one over the phone due to the informants lack 
access to Skype or similar technology. In the months and weeks that followed the interviews, 
I kept in touch with the informants and asked three of them follow-up questions via email. All 
of the interviews were conducted in Norwegian and they were recorded following oral 
consent from the informants. The recordings allowed me to transcribe and later systematically 
analyze the interviews. I transcribed the interviews in Norwegian, however, when quotations 
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from the interviews are used in this thesis, I have translated them to English. A list of the 
interviews is included in the appendix at the very end of the thesis.  
3.2 Interview guides 
The methodological approach to the collection of data in this research was conducted through 
semi-structured interviews. This form of interview relies on a fixed set of themes and/or open-
ended questions but allows the interviewer to slightly diverge from the guide as the interview 
unfolds (Bryman, 2016, p.468). I wanted the informants to answer my questions by taking as 
the starting point their own personal, specialized experience. For example, the initial 
questions about political tension surrounding the Barents-cooperation was formulated in a 
way that allowed the informant to interpret what political tension, if any, they linked with the 
cooperation (See appendix 8.2 for a general version of the interview guide). In this way, the 
aim was to facilitate a flexible interview process (Bryman, 2016, p.468). Facilitating a flexible 
interview process meant that my informants, experts on the Barents-cooperation, could speak 
relatively freely and that I could use the meetings to enhance my knowledge about the topic. 
For the purpose of developing the interview guides, I drew upon and reviewed prior 
conversations and interviews as well as secondary literature and news articles. 
The principal topics of the interview guides followed a similar structure, allowing me to 
uncover common tendencies or disparities in the informants’ answers. Therefore, my 
overarching interest to draw on the informants’ experiences, linking the Barents-cooperation 
to increased geopolitical tension, was always at the crux of the interviews. An important stage 
in designing the interview-guides was converting my theoretical and academic interest into 
practical questions. In order to grapple with the everyday practices of the Barents-
cooperation, I would initially ask the informants to tell me about their own specific role and 
what they do on a daily basis. I also asked the informants about their own personal motivation 
for working with cross-border cooperation, often instigating rich descriptions of the 
informants upbringing in the Barents-region, and how proximity and friendship with Russia 
had always been a part of their lives. For example, one informant said:  
“I grew up close to the border and I took part in sports tournaments that included both 
Russians and Norwegians. I did not see Russia as something scary. Rather, Russians 
were our friends and neighbors - someone I did sports with. It was first when I got 
older that I realized that if it had not been for the Barents-cooperation many of the 
sports tournaments I went to would not have happened” (Interview, 20/02).   
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As I moved on from the introductory questions, I directed attention towards the institution or 
specific project(s) the informant was a part of and asked them to elaborate on its function and 
objective. I also asked about activities and the practical forms of the Barents-cooperation. As 
an entry point to questions about political tensions, I would ask the informants how they 
experienced that the cooperation (or the informants field of cooperation, e.g. education 
cooperation) has developed since they started working with it.  
In what I categorized as the third stage of the interview, I asked about politics, in particular 
increased international tension, Norwegian Russia-policy, and current state of the Norwegian-
Russian relationship. Albeit, sometimes the informant would direct attention towards these 
topics her-/himself before I even asked the questions. This was the most loosely structured 
part of the interview as it was primarily based on how the informants assessed the political 
context surrounding them. And, as mentioned, to begin with I did not name any specific 
political events in my question. Therefore, I formulated questions that begun with phrases like 
“How do you asses…” and “In your experience…”. As the interview moved on, I also asked 
about specific events and developments within the themes of Russian ‘foreign agent’-
legislation, Russian annexation of Crimea, Norwegian center-periphery dynamic, and Barents 
in the Arctic. I also wanted to understand if and how the politics surrounding the cooperation 
had affected their work. If the informants expressed that their activities were unaffected by 
political tensions, I asked why and how they thought it was that way. In the final stages of the 
interviews I would repeat some descriptions of challenges and/or problems the informant had 
articulated during the interview and ask them to elaborate. As such, the interviews followed a 
general structure of: (1) personal background and everyday practices, (2) organization/project 
practices, objectives and development, (3) linking the Barents-cooperation with (geo)political 
tension (see appendix 8.2). Explaining this part of my research process is a way of further 
creating trustworthiness and providing for critical examination of my work. 
While the interview guides followed a similar structure, I would adjust the interview guides 
somewhat for each informant. This allowed me to adapt the questions to the concrete context 
from which the informant operated. It was also a consequence of how my knowledge and 
interest in the Barents-cooperation developed continuously throughout the interview project.   
3.3 Analyzing texts and identifying discourse(s) 
In this study my aim was to learn from the experiences of practitioners in the Barents-
cooperation and how they give meaning to their social world. Therefore, following 
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poststructuralist discourse theoretical approach discussed in the chapter two, the present thesis 
commits to an interpretivist epistemology and a linguistic ontology. Adhering to the post-
positivist idea that it is through language we access and produce knowledge of the world; 
language is the means from which the informants’ interpretations are accessed. Therefore, the 
ontological approach to this study follows the poststructuralist idea of language as 
ontologically significant (Hansen, 2006, p.18).  
Following the poststructuralist approach to discourse analysis, texts are how we access 
subjective interpretations and linguistic constructions of the social world. The main source of 
text in this thesis are the transcriptions of the interviews I have conducted1. They serve as 
subjective interpretations and manifestations of the social world described by the informants. 
The analysis of this thesis therefore relies on the transcriptions of the interviews I have 
conducted. However, the text itself is not the object of study. Rather, as Iver Neumann & 
Kevin Dunne (2016, p.44) reminds us, discourse analysis uses texts as a vehicle for 
understanding social, political, and cultural phenomena. I do not aim to explain causally what 
has led to change, possible disruptions or simply changes to the cooperation. Rather, I am 
interested how the practitioners view and make sense of change. The “impossibility of 
causality”, as articulated by Hansen (2006, p.25), follows naturally from a poststructuralist 
discourse analysis where the material world is seen as discursively constituted. Therefore, 
what is of interest is not what the text argues, but how it argues (Wæver, 2004, p.41).  
How then do we study discourse within the transcribed interviews? Avoiding subjective 
interpretations when analyzing texts is impossible, but by approaching the texts systematically 
the credibility of my interpretations and analysis is strengthened. After transcribing the 
interviews, I have gone through several steps in order to analyze the transcripts. However, the 
first step was already taken when I was transcribing, a process which gave me a broad idea 
and reminder of the content of the interviews. Second, when all the interviews were 
transcribed, I read through each of them while writing small summaries of what I deemed 
most interesting and important at the time. On the second, more thorough, read-through I 
 
1 Adding to the transcriptions of the interviews, are a small proportion of answers to follow-up 
questions received by email in the period after the field trip to Kirkenes. On one occasion I sent one 
follow-up question to two different informants per email. In chapter fiver, I use two quotes from this 




started to categorize the main representations and common tendencies in the interviews. What 
terms the informants used to describe the Barents-cooperation, how they perceived of Russian 
and other Norwegian actors - i.e. reflections over their relations with other actors, and what 
geopolitical events they talked about are examples of the main categories I was concerned 
with. The objective of identifying dominant discourse(s) is to illuminate how meaning is 
structured and to examine how it is linked to the implementation of practices (Neumann & 
Dunne, 2016, p.51). Hence, the central method of this thesis is to analyze and locate 
representations, dominant and marginalized, within the transcriptions of my interviews.  
Moreover, following the idea that foreign policy and identity are co-constitutive, discourse 
analysis provides us with the principal analytical tool for understanding this relationship. In 
mapping and categorizing the discourses and constructions of Self and the Other, I studied the 
texts following the process of linking and differentiation (Hansen, 2006). This process is 
defined by Hansen (2006, p.41) through how “[…] meaning and identity are constructed 
through a series of signs that are linked to each other constitute relations of sameness as well 
as through a differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs”. This may entail 
constructions of what Hansen terms “radical Other(s)”, in which the articulated differences 
between the Self and the Other are stark (Hansen 2006, p.38). It may also entail relations of 
linking, from which difference is less emphasized than sameness. In that way, I have analyzed 
what signs, words, or arguments are used to describe the Self in relation to the Other, and vice 
versa. For example, how the informants tied words like “knowledge” and “understanding” of 
Russia to where in Norway people are from – as one informant said: “Outside the of the 
Barents-region people probably sleep bad at night thinking about Russia. In my opinion, their 
understanding of Russians is skewed. Up here we see things differently.” (Interview, 14/02). 
By being paying attention to Self/Other-dynamics like this, I have been able to uncover how 
the informants refer to identity in their understanding of the Barents-cooperation and the 
geopolitics surrounding them. This follows the poststructuralist argument discussed in the 
previous chapter, that foreign policy discourses entail legitimizations of the policy with 
reference to identities.  
Central to the poststructuralist understanding of discourse is the significance of history 
(Hansen, 2006; Neumann & Dunne, 2016). History is especially essential to the uncovering of 
discursive stability and hegemonic or dominant discourses. Traditionally, the role of history in 
discourses and texts is identified through what is often referred to as intertextuality, meaning 
that all texts make references to previous texts and this way establish re-representations and 
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new meanings (Hansen, 2006, p.55). This thesis bases its discourse analysis on the 
transcriptions of interviews conducted once, and not texts from an extended timeframe. 
However, by drawing on how informants articulate common historical reference points and 
re-represent previous events and practices, the role of history is included in the analysis. This 
is for example evident in chapter 5.3 of the analysis when the informants refer to historical 
events to explain their special relationship with Russia. 
In order to go more in-depth of text material it is normal to delimit the timeframe from which 
texts are collected when doing discourse analysis. In the case of this thesis, the text material 
are transcriptions based on interviews that have been conducted recently. In these interviews 
the informants reflect on changes to the Barents-cooperation and Norwegian-Russian relations 
in recent years. The year of 2014 stands out as a reference point due to the Russian annexation 
of Crimea and the effects it had on international relations, however the informants also reflect 
on situations and observations they have made that are not directly linked to the events of 
2014 – for example developments in the relationship between the Russian state and the 
Russian civil society and increased international interest in the Arctic region. Therefore, it is 
no concrete delimitation of time in this thesis. Rather, the discourse analysis is of the 
contemporary experiences and observations that the informants themselves link with the 
Norwegian-Russian relationship.   
3.4 Assessing data quality  
When doing social research, we must check for validity in order to ensure the trustworthiness 
of our findings. This is an essential part of providing transparency and facilitating critical 
examination of one’s research. Patrick T. Jackson (2010, p.22) refers to internal validity of 
social science when arguing that our conclusions must follow from logical arguments and the 
evidence we provide. As transcripts are my interpretations and representations of the 
informants’ own representations, I actively engage in knowledge production. Hence, the 
interpretations made from the interviews in this study needs to follow from logical and 
coherent arguments. To assure this, throughout my process of interpreting, analyzing, and 
writing I have been guided by the following questions, articulated by Neumann & Dunne 
(2016, p.129): “Do your interpretations make sense to you and your readers? Do they provide 
a reasonable answer for the questions you were trying to answer? Are they more convincing 
than alternative interpretations?”. By constantly reflecting over these questions and 
scrutinizing my own interpretations, the aim has been to assure logical and coherent 
arguments – and thus, internal validity.  
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Moreover, it is essential to reflect on how oneself – the researcher – is situated within 
different discourses and contexts and how this may impact the research process. As Neumann 
& Dunne reminds us, “[…] researchers are not neutral observers, but often are intimately 
related to the power hierarchies at play” (2016, p.58). For the present thesis, this is relevant 
both in my interaction with informants and in interpreting their experiences. In order to 
further provide for a transparent research process, it is therefore important to reflect on my 
own position and my relation to the informants. Importantly, I entered the field as an 
“outsider” and was originally situated within a “Oslo-context”. As will become apparent in 
the following analysis, the informants articulated a center-periphery dynamic in the 
interviews, from which the Other was someone situated in Oslo. It is possible that it in some 
cases had a negative effect on my credibility. My bias as an “outsider” may also have affected 
how I conducted myself. In most instances though, I believe the main outcome of this 
“insider”-“outsider”/“northerner”-“southerner” dynamic was that the informant sought to 
explain their experiences and situations more thoroughly. As to make me an “outsider”, better 
understand what I had no prior experience from myself.  
As researchers, we may tend to favor outcomes that correspond with our expectations. This 
pertains to the possibility of confirmation bias, meaning “the seeking or interpreting of 
evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” 
(Nickerson, 1998, p. 175). In my case, for example by being too insistent on uncovering 
possible problems and challenges in the Barents-cooperation residing from geopolitical 
tension. To avoid this, I made sure I was aware of the danger of falling into the trap of 
confirmation bias, and I reminded myself that I was not looking for causality between 
geopolitical tension and challenges and/or disruptions in the cooperation (as explained above). 
Rather, as I have explained above, I was after the subjective experiences and opinions of my 
informants.  
3.5 Ethical considerations of field work 
This study has been approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Prior to every 
interview the informant was either emailed or given by hand an information letter about my 
research project (see appendix 8.3 for a translated version of the information letter). This way 
they knew about the overarching topic of my research and if they agreed to participate, sign a 
consent form. Before each interview the informants were informed about their rights, told that 
participation is voluntary, and that they could deny answering individual questions. I also 
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informed them that they could contact me with question and/or withdraw from the project at 
any time after the interview.  
One of the most important and challenging ethical considerations I have made during this 
project is related to the issue of anonymization. I made the decision to anonymize all my 
informants but two. Nevertheless, regarding the type of interview-based research conducted 
here there have been several issues and implications to consider. An important aspect 
affecting my decision was the fact that the Barents-cooperation is a relatively small field of 
analysis. In Kirkenes, where a large proportion of my informants work and live, people in and 
around the cooperation generally all know each other or know who each other is. 
Anonymizing while simultaneously providing the context from which the informant could say 
what she/he said is a challenge. Yet, the small field of analysis made anonymization the 
ethically responsible choice as the informants were asked to reflect on politics related to their 
line of work. Although, my research process itself may not have caused harm to anyone, harm 
could be done as the findings are made public. Working in and around the Barents-
cooperation means building amicable cross-border relations. As one informant said: “The 
Barents cooperation is part of a greater Norwegian Arctic strategy for peace and stability in 
the Arctic. This is achieved through good and constructive relations with Russia on a 
practical level – something we invest in every day” (Interview, 03/03). Talking about possible 
disruptions and challenges to the cooperation residing from political tensions is therefore 
considered sensitive. As a result of that, the decision to anonymize most of the informants was 
taken. The most frequently quoted anonymized informants have been given pseudonyms.  
However, I decided after consent not to anonymize Rune Rafaelsen who is the mayor in Sør-
Varanger and Thomas Nilsen who is a journalist in the Independent Barents Observer. There 
are a couple of reasons for this. First of all, they are both outspoken and public figures in the 
local community and in the Barents-region. They are therefore used to expressing their 
opinions in the public. Secondly, seeing as how they are both relatively known figures in the 
community, to some even nationally, hiding their identity would be difficult and arguably 
counter-productive. They are both key actors in the Barents-region and by using their real 
names their statements used here gain credibility. Both have been sent transcripts of the 
quotes I’ve used from their interviews, giving them the opportunity to revise their statements, 
reject the usage of them and/or give consent. In both cases consent was given per email to use 
their quotes without any alterations or objections.  
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4 Norway-Russia relations: Three trends 
In this chapter, I discuss three trends in the Norwegian-Russian relationship in order to 
contextualize the role of the Barents-cooperation in Norwegian foreign policy. I point how 
cross-border cooperation between Norwegians and Russians during the Cold War-era 
preceded and laid the foundation for establishing the Barents-cooperation in 1993. Particular 
attention is also paid to how a central argument for making the Barents-cooperation part of the 
Norwegian Russia policy was to engage local and regional actors in foreign policy practice. 
Finally, I argue that recent years have seen a (re)turn to a colder and more tense relationship 
between Norway, its western allies, and Russia.  
4.1 Formalizing Cold War cooperation 
In 1949, Norway became one of the founding members of NATO as they signed the Atlantic 
Treaty. As such, Norway became part of its neighbor the Soviet Union’s antipole during the 
Cold War. Therefore, a strategy of deterrence was sought by Norway through its NATO 
membership during the Cold War years and focus on interstate collaboration was limited 
(Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018, p.387). However, as Norway shared a border with the Soviet 
Union, it was seen as essential to combine the policy of deterrence with that of reassurance 
(Holtsmark, 2015). As such, Norway implemented a self-restraining base policy in 1949 that 
was meant to reassure Soviet that although Norway was allied with the US, they did not need 
to fear US military bases in Norway (Holtsmark, 2015, p.315).  
Importantly, the Norwegian-Russian relations during the cold war far from exclusively 
confrontational. Cooperation within marine research and fisheries in the Barents-sea between 
Norway and Russia has roots going back to the early 1900s. But it wasn’t until in 1975 that 
the two neighbors established the Fisheries Commission from which they have jointly 
managed the fish stocks in the Barents-sea since (Hønneland, 2006; Joint Russian-Norwegian 
Fisheries Commission, n.d.). On the regional level, cooperation had also begun during the 
Cold War (Landsem, 2012; Holtsmark, 2015, p.538). After years of regional informal contact, 
trade, and building relations across the Norwegian-Russian border, a friendship agreement 
between Sør-Varanger municipality and Petchenga municipality was signed in 1976. In 1988, 
Finnmark county and Murmansk oblast also signed a friendship agreement (Holtsmark, 2015, 
p.540). These agreements laid the foundation for increased economic cooperation, and also 
other relevant fields. However, while it is important to point out that here was cooperation 
across the Norwegian-Russian border during the Cold-War, it is also essential to be aware of 
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the changing international political context in the 1980s and early 1990s that made the 
creation of the Barents-cooperation possible.  
As the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991 and the Cold War came to an end, the 
opportunity to expand cooperation to the national level emerged. Norwegian minister of 
foreign affairs at the time, Thorvald Stoltenberg, wanted to seize the moment of a Russia that 
was open and positive towards international dialogue and cooperation (Holtsmark, 2015, 
p.557). This moment of possibility was expressed and made possible a couple of years earlier 
in 1987, when Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party at the time, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, made a series of foreign policy proposals for the Arctic region in what has later 
come to be called the Murmansk Initiative (Holtsmark, 2015, p.531). Adding to the list of 
strategic political symbolism contributing to goodwill between Norway and Russia during this 
period, is the fact that Norway was the first country to acknowledge Russia as a sovereign 
state in 1991 (Holtsmark, 2015 p.547). Furthermore, as the Cold War came to an end, NATO 
became less of a military presence in Russia’s near abroad, including in Norway. Although 
Russia maintained a significant military presence in its northwest region, this was seen as a 
part of a balancing act with the USA without having regional implications hampering the 
Barents initiative (Kvistad, 1995, p.24; Fawcett, 2018, p.288). Moreover, NATO had to 
reinvent itself, and cooperative security became part of the agenda (Adler, 2008, p.212). The 
end of the Cold war also signaled a move towards increased regionalism in Europe (Kvistad, 
1995, p.38). Hence, the Barents initiative followed an international trend with a cooperative 
security agenda, as opposed to the confrontational security strategy of the Cold-War years 
(Eriksson, 1995, p.260). All of this, together with the cooperative foundation that was already 
built between regional entities in Northern Norway and Northwestern Russia, added up to an 
international political context where cooperation with Russia was possible and seemed 
logical. 
The opportunity was eventually seized upon when in 1993, the Kirkenes declaration was 
signed by Russia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the European 
Commission (EC) – officially initiating the Barents-cooperation. This meant to unite the 
northern-European areas, ease the aftershock of the cold war, and create renewed trust 
between Russia and its neighbors (Holtsmark, 2015, p.615). The three concepts of 
stabilization, normalization and regionalization were fundamental and outspoken goals of the 
regional cooperation (Eriksson, 1995, p.273). This was to be achieved through cooperation in 
a range of fields: environment, economy, science and technology, regional infrastructure, 
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indigenous peoples, human contact and cultural relations, and tourism were all mentioned 
specifically (Kirkenes Declaration, 1993). An important driver for establishing the 
cooperation was the desire to enhance economic development in the region – specially to 
address the gap in living standards between people in the region (Eriksson, 1995, p.274). As 
such, traditional security-issues, such as military and defense, were excluded from the 
cooperation. Rather, it was the ambition of the Norwegian MFA that security (stabilization, 
normalization and regionalization) would be achieved as an extended consequence of the 
everyday practices of cooperation within the aforementioned fields. This pertains to an idea of 
‘low-politics’ with spillover-effect to ‘high-politics’2 (Eriksson, 1995, p.271; Kvistad, 1995, 
p.40). 
As we have seen, the creation of the Barents-cooperation was a continuation and 
formalization of collaboration between Norway and Russia that had been going before the 
Soviet had dissolved. In the following subchapter, it becomes apparent how these historical 
ties of cooperation between Russia and Norway both before and during the Cold War was an 
essential component as the Norwegian MFA sought to legitimize the Barents-cooperation.  
4.2 Decentralizing Norwegian foreign policy practice 
The Norwegian MFA put a lot of effort into legitimizing the cooperation when it started. This 
was done by drawing on historical connections. While the creation of the Barents-region 
signaled the start of a formalized Barents cooperation, as we saw above the people-to-people 
cooperation across the border had been going on long before the Kirkenes declaration in 1993 
(Holtsmark, 2015). The Norwegian MFA ordered reports articulating an account of how 
cooperation between Russia and Norway was a natural consequence of the end of the Cold 
War (Eriksson, 1995, p.273; Neumann, 2002, p.64). One important historical connection is 
the pomor trade, between what is now Northwestern Russians and Northern Norwegians, that 
started in the seventeen-hundreds and lasted for more than a century (Schrader, 1988, p.111). 
Another central historical focal point is the fact that Soviets Red Army liberated Finnmark 
from Nazi Germany in 1945. Drawing on stories of a friendly cross-border relationship only 
disrupted by the years of Cold War and communism, the creation of the Barents-region was 
 
2 Stanley Hoffman made a distinction between ‘low politics’ and ‘high politics’ in his article from 
1966. ‘Low politics’ represent social and human security, while sovereignty i.e. state security is 
defined as ‘high politics’. Despite its critique, these concepts have been frequently used since. E.g. 
Andreas Østhagen (2016, p.91) makes use of these concepts in order to highlight how bilateral coast 
guard cooperation in the Behring and Barents Seas, defined as ‘low politics’, have been able to 
continue despite conflict in the realm of ‘high politics’. 
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articulated as merely “re-establishing” the relationship (Neumann, 2002, p.64). Hence, 
following Hansen that foreign policies are legitimized through references to identity, the 
Russian Other was constructed as less of a threat and more of a natural and logical 
cooperation-partner. And it was done by drawing on the local Northern Norwegian 
relationship with Northwestern Russia – as such co-opting this as part of the history of the 
bilateral relationship between the two neighbors. Thus, the creation of the Barents-
cooperation entailed a politically initiated identity-formation project of the people in the 
region and across the borders (Hønneland, 1998, p.280).  
Some Norwegian politicians were skeptical to bilaterally engage with Russia, as it was 
perceived as a break with the Norwegian tradition of interacting with the eastern neighbor 
through multilateral channels (Holtsmark, 2015, p.617). Skepticism was also expressed 
among politicians in Northern Norway, as the security tension, potential confrontation with 
Russia and the subsequent militarization of the region was a source of employment 
(Holtsmark, 2015, p.617). Nevertheless, there was generally a broad political agreement that 
cross-border cooperation would be beneficial.  
As the cooperation became a reality, skepticism still lingered amongst politicians within the 
central Norwegian government who were against the institutional structure of the cooperation 
that included ley people in foreign affairs. (Neumann, 2002; Holtsmark, 2015). In their view 
the structure of the Barents-cooperation was perceived as a deviation of normal foreign policy 
practice (Neumann, 2002, p.641). An essential aspect of the Barents-cooperation was the 
decentralization of Norwegian foreign policy. Meaning that a fundamental part of making the 
Barents-cooperation part of Norway’s Russia policy was, and still is, engaging local and 
regional actors in the foreign policy practice. The aim was to include civil society, indigenous 
communities, and business actors into collaboration on the many issues encompassed by the 
Barents-cooperation. Actors from all the northernmost regions in Norway included in the 
Barents-region - Nordland, Troms and Finnmark - could apply for projects including partners 
from Russia (as well as Finland and Sweden). The local people-to-people engagement is often 
termed as the “motor” of the Barents-cooperation. Thorvald Stoltenberg said, “it was the very 
idea that the motor of the cooperation should be tended to by the people in the North” (As 
cited by Neumann, 2002, p.642). Kirkenes, the administrative center of Sør-Varanger 
municipality, became a regional hotspot. So much so, that “the Barents Capital” is a 
commonly used nickname for the town – neatly underscoring the entanglement between the 
local and international in Kirkenes. 
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Hence, the creation of the Barents-cooperation entailed building an institutional structure 
centered in northern Norway. The Norwegian Barents Secretariat – hereby the NBS – was 
established in 1993 and is an intermunicipal corporation owned by Nordland, and Troms and 
Finnmark. Their office is in Kirkenes with 12 full-time employees (in 2020). The employees 
have different areas of expertise and responsibility - from culture projects to business and 
industry projects. As such, the NBS is by one of the informants termed a regional center of 
competence3. The main activity of the secretariat is administering and distributing project 
funds from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Their mission is to create 
broad activity between the people living in the Norwegian and Russian Barents region4. 
Annually they receive a letter of assignment from the MFA, which instructs their work and 
distribution of funds. While being responsible for coordinating and granting project funds, the 
secretariat also often serves as a middleman between actors across the border putting Russians 
and Norwegians in contact. In the very same building as the Norwegian Secretariat is the 
International Barents Secretariat which was established in 2008. Their role is to facilitate 
meetings and support activity in the BEAC and the BRC and serve as a mediator between the 
regional and governmental levels (Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, 2020).  
At the inter-regional level is the Barents Regional Council (BRC) consisting of the thirteen 
regional entities that make up the Barents-region5 and representatives from the indigenous 
peoples in the region (Regjeringen, 2015). Like the BEAC, the regional council also has 
rotating chairmanship. In the Norwegian part of the region are the counties Nordland and 
Troms & Finnmark. While not exclusively a part of the Barents cooperation, the counties 
have important ownership roles in several of the Barents-institutions including their position 
in the regional council. Moreover, Troms & Finnmark is the only Norwegian county 
bordering Russia. At the municipal level, the mayor of Sør-Varanger, the only Norwegian 
municipality bordering Russia, has traditionally taken on an active and vocal role in 
promoting the Barents-cooperation and the interests of the local population in relation to 
Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia. The current mayor of Sør-Varanger, Rune 
Rafaelsen, has for many years been a powerful political figure in the Barents-region, both as 
head of the NBS from 2003 to 2015 and as mayor from 2016. His active role in promoting the 
 
3 Interview with anonymous 1, 20/02, Kirkenes 
4 Interview with Håvard, a practitioner with several years of experience from the official Barents-cooperation 
institutions. 26/02, Kirkenes.  
5 Nordland, Troms & Finnmark in Norway. Västerbotten and Norrbotten in Sweden. Lapland, Oulu and Kainuu 
in Finland. Murmansk, Karelen, Arkhangelsk, Komi, and Nenets in Russia. 
27 
 
cooperation and his regional political ambitions both nationally and internationally led one of 
the informants to describe him as a “local foreign minister”6.  
At the state-level with exclusive involvement in the Barents Cooperation is the Barents Euro 
Arctic Council (BEAC) which is the intergovernmental organ of the cooperation. This is 
where the foreign ministries of the countries within the region sit, as well as Iceland and the 
EU commission. The countries that make up the geographic Barents-region are Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and Finland. The chairmanship of the council rotates every four years 
between the four member states. From 2019 to 2021 Norway has the chairmanship with 
people-to-people, health, and knowledge as the stated focus areas. Under BEAC is several 
working groups with responsibility for different fields of cooperation (e.g. culture, sports, 
education etc.).  
Following from the observations in this subchapter, the creation of the Barents-cooperation 
entailed an institutionalizing the decentralization of foreign policy practice. Kirkenes became 
a new node in Norwegian foreign policy and the people-to-people contact that had been a part 
of Northern Norwegians and Northwestern Russians lives for many years was made part of 
official Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the optimism 
that characterized the interstate Norwegian-Russian relationship when the cold war came to 
an end (exemplified by the creation of the Barents-cooperation) has in recent years been 
overshadowed and influenced by increased tension in the Western-Russian relationship. 
4.3 Increased tension: The ‘new normal’? 
The international climate and political transformations within Russia as the Cold War came to 
an end enabled Norwegian and Russian decision-makers to engage in institution-building in 
the North. However, since then the relationship between Western states and Russia have 
spiraled into new confrontations reviving divisions between the Cold war enemies – also 
influencing Norwegian-Russian interstate relations. Thus, the geopolitical context within 
which the Barents-cooperation and its practitioners operates has changed. I argue here, that 
this is apparent both in terms of concrete events and in rhetoric.  
Drawing on securitization theory, Leif C. Jensen (2012) argues that Norwegian threat 
narratives about Russia have been revived in Norway in the 2000s. He shows how Norwegian 
government white papers and statements made references to security in order to legitimize its 
 
6 Interview with Anonymous 4, 14/02, Kirkenes. 
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strategy in the High North7 in the early 2000s. In 2005 the Norwegian government at the time 
launched its High North Initiative which centered on resource exploitation of the oil and gas 
reserves in the area (Jensen, 2012, p.82). This followed a speech by foreign minister at the 
time, Jonas Gahr Støre, in which he framed the ability to secure stable supplies of energy as 
central to security and stability in the region. According to Jensen (2012, p.94), while Støre’s 
speech and the government initiative did not articulate Norwegian ‘state security’ as under 
threat from Russia, different security conceptions draw on each other, and the securitization of 
energy in the High North made security dominate the national discourse on the High North. 
Embedded in this discourse was a (re)construction of Russia as a radical Other in the 
“collective Norwegian mind” by discursive constructions by politicians and in the media of 
Norway as a tiny and vulnerable country juxtaposed with the “massive Russia (“The Russian 
Bear)” (Jensen, 2012, p. 94).  
Nevertheless, it is the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 that stands out as the landmark 
event in the Western-Russian and Norwegian-Russian relationship since the end of the Cold 
War. It led to an acknowledgement that European security situation had changed when five 
Nordic ministers wrote in a collaborate chronicle: “We must realize that it is no longer 
business as usual, and that a new normal is upon us” 8 (Aftenposten, April 9th 2015). Norway, 
unsurprisingly due its membership in NATO, close ties to the US and EU, and adherence to 
the principles of the liberal international order, joined the subsequent sanctions-regime 
towards Russia. Western sanctions were met with counter sanctions by Russia. While 
perceiving and articulating Russia as an enemy is not a new practice, the years following 2014 
saw a sharpening of the Norwegian rhetoric towards Russia (Rowe, 2018). According to Lars 
Rowe, since 2014 Norwegian media is increasingly speculating and constructing threat 
narratives about Russian ambitions, intentions, and methods (2018, p.11). Rowe refers to 
examples from headlines from Norwegian newspapers such as: “New and old enemies 
threaten Norway” and “This is how Russia can Attack Norway” (2018, p.5)9.  Norwegian 
threat narratives about Russia has therefore continued to rise after the Russian annexation of 
Crimea in 2014 (Rowe, 2018; Wilhelsen & Gjerde, 2018). 
 
7 In this thesis I use three geopolitical terms – the Barents-region, the Arctic, and the High North. The Barents-
region was outlined in chapter 4.2. The Arctic refers to the area within the Arctic circle – the whole circumpolar 
territory. The High North is a more politized area and does not have a set definition. However, in this thesis it 
refers to Norwegian territory in the Arctic region. 
8 My translation 
9 These are my translations of the headlines written in Norwegian as presented in Rowe’s article.  
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Simultaneously, in the past decade there has been an increased militarization in and around 
the Barents-region. As part of the balancing act that is, and has been for decades, the 
Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia, Norway has not allowed its allies in NATO to 
establish military bases on its territory. As seen above, this used to be a welcomed and valued 
principle of reassurance in the eyes of Russia. Already in the 1990s this self-imposed 
restriction policy was slightly cut back (Holtsmak, 2015, p.562). The move away from this 
policy has continued since, for example visible through NATO-led exercises on Norwegian 
territory in recent years. Thereby, the Norwegian approach to the north has become 
increasingly militarized and, as we saw above, securitized. Concurrently, Russia has increased 
militarization in the Northern Norwegian vicinity, all together leading to a more tense 
dynamic between the two neighbors (Vestvik & Rosenby, 2019).  
As such, what we have seen the past decades up until today is an increased geopolitical 
tension. I argue therefore, that increasing geopolitical tension post 2014 has stabilized as the 
‘new normal’, in the words of the foreign minister and her Nordic colleagues. This ‘new 
normal’ expresses a change in the political context within which the Barents-cooperation 
operates. As seen above, the period in which cooperation was established, reflected a different 
sentiment: as the Soviet Union dissolved the discursive representation of Russia in Norwegian 
public discourse changed. Central to this change was historical narratives of pomor-trade and 
the Soviet saviors of Finnmark in WWII. The communist era appeared as an exception in 
history, although during the Soviet-period, relationships of cooperation were also nurtured 
regionally. Politically, the opportunity to define and create a cross-border region for business 
exchange, including cultural and social interaction, was seized in the early 1990s. Three 
decades later, the liberal world order is crumbling and the geopolitical tension between the 
West and Russia has deteriorated partly due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This is the 
‘new normal’ in global politics. Yet, the Barents-cooperation sustains, in everyday activities, 
collaboration and exchanges. How do the people working with Barents-cooperation in a day 
to day business make sense of this ‘new normal’? It is with that question in mind that the 
thesis now turns to the practitioners of the cooperation, as the following chapter puts the 




5 The Barents-cooperation and geopolitical tension 
In order to understand how practitioners in the Barents-cooperation experience and make 
sense of the recent geopolitical and interstate tensions surrounding the cooperation, I will now 
direct attention towards their own stories. Here, my interviews with practitioners are used to 
show how the they link geopolitical tension in contemporary Norwegian-Russian relations 
with the Barents-cooperation. Their experiences will be analyzed on the basis of the discourse 
analytical approach outlined in chapter two and three. In this way, I illustrate how geopolitics 
can be interpreted from the interviews and how geopolitical tension is reflected in discourse 
within the Barents-cooperation. As the practitioners link the cooperation to geopolitical 
tension the analysis reveals how the cooperation is legitimized, and identities and challenges 
are constructed.  
In terms of structure, the chapter is divided into four sub-sections following empirical 
observations emerging from the interviews. These are highlighted as the following political 
events and developments that the informants reflected upon: (5.1) the annexation of Crimea, 
consequent sanctions-regime in 2014, and a colder political climate, (5.2) authoritative turns 
in Russian politics and consequences for civil society cooperation, (5.3) the Frode Berg-case 
and Fokus 2020-report, and (5.4) the increasing international interest in the Arctic region.  
5.1 Reviving justifications for the Barents-cooperation post-2014 
In the following analysis I explain how the informants use the annexation of Crimea in 2014 
and the subsequent geopolitical tension to emphasize the uniqueness and importance of the 
Barents-cooperation. They describe a collaboration that has been able to retain its cooperative 
activities and articulate a series of justifications for why the cooperation is needed now more 
than ever. As a geopolitical event, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 is arguably the 
toughest test the post-Cold War relationship between the transatlantic allies and Russia has 
had to endure. In many ways, it is yet to recover from it. It is an event that raises questions 
about sovereignty, state behavior, and international law. As discussed in chapter four, the 
annexation and subsequent sanctions had, and still have, an impact on the bilateral 
Norwegian-Russian relationship.  
However, the informants repeatedly emphasized how the Barents-cooperation has steered 
clear of disruptions after the annexation of Crimea. For example, an informant from the 
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Norwegian MFA with experience from working with the Barents-cooperation – hereby called 
the MFA source10 – said that: 
“There is no basis today for saying that Barents cooperation is hampered or 
characterized by a slightly more complicated geopolitical situation. It is in a way a 
collaboration that has been spared the great controversies.” (Interview, 03/03). 
Also informants working with education, sport and theatre respectively, all express that their 
cooperative practice remained unaffected and steered clear of political tension amid 2014. Pål, 
a local with decades of experience from education cooperation in the region, said that “We 
[people working with education projects] have never been affected by any disputes between 
the countries” (Interview, 28/02). He also explained how in the months after Russia annexed 
Crimea he met with Russian and Swedish representatives in order to expand ongoing 
education projects. The meeting resulted in the creation of “Arctic Skills” – an annual 
competition in vocational skills with participants from Finnmark in Norway, Lapland in 
Finland, and Murmansk in Russia. While the motivation for ‘Arctic Skills’ was unrelated to 
the increased geopolitical tension, Pål uses it as an example of how education cooperation 
continued to develop despite increased tension after the Russian annexation of Crimea.  
Yet, cooperation activity did not go entirely unaffected after 2014. The sanctions-regime that 
followed the annexation led to a more difficult business environment across the Russian-
Norwegian border. Especially as Russia stopped the import of fish from Norway. As a direct 
reaction to the sanctions, the county mayor of Finnmark at the time publicly stated her 
opposition to Norwegian adherence to the sanctions-regime as it was harming local trade 
(Dagsavisen, 2019). According to the experienced cooperation practitioner Håvard, the 
sanctions have become “a factor” influencing business and industry cooperation11. This is also 
expressed in the interview with an expert on business and industry cooperation in the Barents-
region: “During the 90s, business was flourishing compared to today. There is less, way less 
business and industry cooperation now which is partly due to the annexation of Crimea and 
increased geopolitical tension.” (Anonymous 1, 20/02). Importantly, according to several of 
the informants, business and industry cooperation was already considered difficult before 
2014 due to what they term differences in business culture12. Further, according to the 
 
10 “The MFA source” is the informant’s own desired nickname. In the interview appendix the informant is 
referred to as anonymous 2. 
11 Interview, 07/02, Skype. 
12 Interview, 20/02, Kirkenes (Anonymous 1) & Interview, 20/02, Kirkenes (Anonymous 3).  
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business and industry expert, the general escalation of tension in inter-state relations in recent 
years, have dampened interest amongst Norwegian actors to invest in business with Russian 
partners. Hence, the past decade has seen the development of an unpredictable investment 
environment for this type of profit-seeking cooperation. This has led the NBS to take on a 
more active role in promoting cooperation investment possibilities and initiating projects, 
more so than what they do within the other fields of cooperation, according to several 
informants. However, as expressed by both Håvard and the expert on business and industry in 
the region, the NBS is facing an uphill struggle in trying to foster interest from Norwegian 
actors at present.  
Moreover, the informants often refer to how the Norwegian government has shown its 
commitment to the cooperation. This is presented as essential because support from central 
authorities legitimizes and justifies the practitioners and their work. After the annexation of 
Crimea and implementation of the sanctions-regime, some of the informants explain how they 
were interested to see how the central government would communicate the situation to them. 
As we have seen, at the time minister of defense Eriksen Søreide, called the increased tension 
a ‘new normal’. However, the informants say they received, and continue to receive, support 
and reassurance from a Norwegian government that remains committed to the cooperation in 
the Barents-region. Clara, an informant with several years of experience with allocation of 
project funds at the NBS and culture cooperation, explained that,  
“even though the international political context is colder, and Norway adheres to the 
sanctions-regime, Norwegian politicians tell us to keep going like before. I mean, after 
2014 there’s never been talk of reducing our activity or changing course. On the 
contrary, the Norwegian government said that the people-to-people cooperation in the 
North shall endure as usual.” (Interview, 19/02). 
As Clara expresses in this quote, she does not mind that the Norwegian government adheres 
to the sanctions regime as long as their support to the Barents-cooperation remains. Also 
Nina, an informant with more than two decades of experience from theater and culture 
cooperation, emphasizes the importance of being supported by the government when 
geopolitical tension is on the rise. She refers to a statement from foreign minister at the time 
Børge Brende, when in 2017 the Samovar-theater received the Barents Scholarship for 
Culture Cooperation, where he emphasized the importance of cultural cooperation to appease 
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bilateral relations with Russia13: “Børge Brende’s statement was very important to us. Since, 
we have used it in applications for funding and grants” (Interview, 19/02). As such, linking 
their cultural practices and giving the people-to-people collaboration they engage in an 
extended meaning as part of Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia is a strategic way for 
practitioners to legitimize the cooperative practices and being able to retain them.  
With the backdrop of retained cooperation activity after 2014, the informants construe the 
Barents-cooperation as standing in contrast to other types of cooperative platforms that broke 
down after the annexation: “At national level there has been a decrease in inter-governmental 
meetings as well as decreased cooperation amid 2014. For example, defense-cooperation has 
completely broken down […]. However, we’ve seen a slight increase in the number of 
Barents-cooperation projects” (Håvard, 07/02). In explaining why he believes the Barents-
cooperation has been retained, as opposed to for example defense-cooperation, Håvard paints 
a picture of a unique cooperation. The emphasis on the uniqueness of the Barents-cooperation 
when talking about the deteriorating political climate after 2014 is a common trait in the 
interviews. Clara also reflects on what makes the cooperation unique when asked about what 
she believes have made the Barents-cooperation able to continue as before after the events of 
2014: “It’s the people-to-people element of the Barents-cooperation. The fact that ordinary 
people participate in a foreign policy cooperation, makes it unique in an international 
context.” (Interview, 19/02). In that wat, it is not just about continued governmental support; 
to the informants, the Barents-cooperation is unique and able to maintain the status quo 
despite geopolitical tension due to its involvement of “ordinary people”.  
From Knut’s understanding, a local practitioner with decades of experience from cross-border 
sports cooperation, the friendships created across the border are too strong for them to break 
down due to geopolitical tension tension14. This idea is also articualted by mayor Rafaelsen: 
“The Barents-cooperation is retained despite polarization because it has created trust. When 
you’re cooperating with Russia you need to build a relationship over time. And that’s why I 
think the Barents-cooperation is so great; it builds trust between people” (Interview, 21/02). 
As such, geopolitical tension and the retained cooperative activity after 2014 are used to 
reaffirm the uniqueness of the cooperation. In order to make sense of how they have been able 
to retain cooperative activity amidst geopolitical tension, the informants emphasize the 
 
13 Børge Brende’s qoutes from this occasion are cited here: https://samimag.no/nb/nyheter/samovarteateret-et-
storpolitisk-pluss/ 
14 Interview, 08/06  
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decentralized foreign policy practice and people-to-people aspect as unique elements of the 
Barents-cooperation.  
Furthermore, it often emerged in the interviews how the practitioners see the Barents-
cooperation as a soft-security mechanism. They see themselves and their work as not only 
contributing to amicable relations between people across the border, but as producing long-
term security through their everyday practice. For example, one informant said that “What we 
do is soft-security in practice. So I would say that the Barents-cooperation is a security policy 
– and it works.” (Anonymous 1, 20/02). Clara augmented this view, saying:  
“We contribute to creating generations of Norwegian and Russians who in the future 
might be leaders in their countries or regions, and due to our contribution, they might 
know each other. That leads to a normalized relationship. So, with small steps, we 
contribute to a more stable society – and stability is security.” (Interview, 19/02) 
Here, cooperation projects involving local youngsters are understood as a practice 
contributing in the long run to a generation of friends across the border. This relates to the 
idea of a “Barents-generation” and a “Barents-identity” (Hønneland, 1998, p.289). The 
generations growing up in the region after the creation of the Barents-cooperation are thus 
said to embody a Barents-identity, securing peaceful relations across the border in the years to 
come. That way, the Barents-cooperation, its practitioners and their everyday cooperative 
practice are represented as a security mechanism.   
The informants believe that the Barents-cooperation’s security mechanism becomes 
increasingly important and fruitful during geopolitical tension. This is because it provides 
people, from locals to government officials, with a meeting place. As Marius, an informant 
with several years of experience from working at the Northern Norwegian European Office 
(NNEO) in Brussels said, “the Barents-cooperation has become a framework for upholding 
contact after 2014” (Interview, 22/04). In Brussels, the promotion of the Barents-cooperation 
has continued after 2014. Marius explains why continued promotion of the cooperation is 
important: 
“Although there are disagreements between Oslo and Moscow, the cooperation across 
the border needs to go on as normal. People can disagree whether the annexation was a 
violation of international law but you still have to manage the fishing resources in the 
Barents Sea and you still have to remove all the nuclear waste on the Kola Peninsula, 
you still need to engage in cultural exchange, and sports. Things going on as normal is 
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essential – the people living close to the border haven’t done anything wrong.” 
(Interview, 22/04) 
Marius also said that promoting the Barents-cooperation in Brussel has become increasingly 
difficult amid the Russian annexation of Crimea. This, according to him, is because other 
European states have grown increasingly tired of Russia’s actions in the past decade. Yet, the 
NNEO continues to promote the cooperation and its benefits. After 2014 they have continued 
organizing seminars in Brussels on the Barents region and cooperation, just as they had been 
doing in the years prior to the annexation, according to Marius. Based on the experiences and 
reflections of the practitioners interviewed, the idea that the cooperation “needs to go on as 
normal” highlights a general concurrence within the Barents-cooperation.  
Håvard, also emphasized the importance of the cooperation during times of tension, as he is 
“convinced that the Barents cooperation is an important platform making it easier to 
maintain dialogue, especially in times of conflict. […] In my opinion the Barents-cooperation 
reduce conflict and is as such a soft security policy” (Interview, 07/02). Central to this idea is 
the notion that the cooperation at the regional level transcends to the inter-governmental: 
“This is important on a regional level, but in fact there is so much activity that it 
transcends to the national level. For example, [Norwegian foreign minister at the time] 
Børge Brende had three official meetings with Lavrov after 2014 and they were all 
related to the Barents cooperation. We know that when the foreign ministers meet 
through the Barents cooperation, such as the World War II liberation anniversary, it is 
possible for them to talk politics.” (Interview, 07/02) 
This quote underscores how the informants portray the cooperation with enhanced meaning 
and relevance. The “unique” Barents-cooperation facilitates meetings between people (from 
locals to government officials) despite being surrounded by a cold geopolitical climate. For 
example, in the quote above, Håvard argues that after 2014 the Barents-cooperation has 
provided the Norwegian and the Russian foreign ministers with a platform from which they 
can engage in dialogue. As such, the informants represent the Barents-cooperation as a 
platform for normalization in the relationship between Norway and Russia. Mayor Rafaelsen, 
who was head of the NBS from 2003 to 2015 and therefore at the time when Russia annexed 
Crimea, concurs with this framing of the Barents-cooperation as an important platform in 
times of inter-governmental tension:  
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“The Barents-cooperation has been an extremely important factor maintaining 
dialogue between Russia and Norway. We fully understand the sanctions that came 
after Russia… Went into Crimea. But you need to look forward and maintain 
dialogue. You may call it peace-communication, because if you don’t talk to each 
other, relations will get more tense” (Interview, 21/02).  
In this pragmatic statement, Rafaelsen uses the increased tension after 2014 to emphasize the 
importance of the Barents-cooperation. The cooperation is represented as a means, or 
“foundation”, from which interstate tension can be kept at a tolerable level. Following Hansen 
(2006), it is stipulated that foreign policy discourses entail legitimizations of the policy. This 
is evident in the discourse uncovered here, as it is apparent in the interviews how the events of 
2014 are used to revive justification of the Barents-cooperation by saying something positive 
about it. They use words and phrases such as “soft-security mechanism”, “normalization”, 
“platform maintaining dialogue”, “peace-communication” when talking about the cooperation 
in the context of geopolitical tension after 2014. That way, the cooperation and the different 
activities that falls under it are construed with the enhanced meaning of a security mechanism. 
This underlines a representation of the Barents-cooperation as a mediator for peaceful 
relations between Norway and Russia and as a tool to maintain this aspect of Norwegian 
foreign policy despite a complicated relationship after 2014.  
My observation in this subchapter is that the informants almost exclusively use the annexation 
of Crimea in 2014 to revive justification of and thus legitimize the Barents-cooperation 
cooperation. They respond to increased inter-governmental tension after 2014 by constructing 
arguments for more and continued Barents-cooperation. This is a central part of the discourse 
constructed by the informants accentuating their role as foreign policy practitioners and 
representing the Barents-cooperation as a proactive force in the relationship between the 
countries. A notion that is backed up and legitimized by the construction of the Barents-
cooperation as a soft-security mechanism contributing to de-escalation in the face of 
deteriorating interstate relationships. As such, this subchapter provided insight into the 
practitioners understanding of the Barents-cooperation and their own role in a colder 
international political climate. The discourse conveys a representation of the Barents-
cooperation that is adapted to the ‘new normal’ – making it relevant and more important 
because inter-governmental tension is on the rise. By arguing that everything “needs to go on 
as normal”, as articulated by one of the informants, they argue to maintain the status quo and 
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in that way the Barents-cooperation is represented as a counterweight to the increased tension 
between Norway and Russia.  
Now that we have seen how the events of 2014 sharpens the informants justifications of the 
cooperation, it is relevant to go more into depth and analyze how the practitioners see 
themselves and their own role. In the next section I direct attention towards more concrete 
events and developments that the informants brought up in the interviews. As we shall see, 
when the informants talk about the relationship between Russian state and Russian civil 
society, they represent domestic politics in Russia as a challenge to the cooperation, and 
simultaneously construct an idea of Self.  
5.2 The Self as a “supporter” of the “vulnerable” Russian civil society 
Authoritative developments in Russian politics and the effect it has on Russian civil society 
frequently emerged in the interviews. This caught my interest because the informants noted 
how the Russian ‘foreign agent’-legislation from 2012 has had consequences for the Barents-
cooperation and made it more difficult to collaborate across the Norwegian-Russian border. 
The ‘foreign agent’-legislation stipulating that NGOs receiving funding from abroad can be 
labeled ‘foreign agent’. This means that a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate civil 
society in Russia is made (Stuvøy, 2020, p.1). Moreover, the legislation forces NGOs to self-
identify within the rigid civil-society categories defined by the Russian state. This way, state 
dominance narrows NGO identity and space for agency (Stuvøy, 2020, p.7). In 2015, the 
‘foreign agent’-legislation was followed by an ‘undesirable organizations’ law, allowing the 
Russian state to label a foreign or international NGO “undesirable” if it is deemed to be a 
threat to the state (Lipman, 2016, p. 346). In this subchapter, I analyze how this Russian 
national context is represented in relation to the Barents-cooperation. Specifically, I explain 
how informants construct the Self as a “supporter” of a “weak” Russian civil society, thereby 
constructing the Russian civil society in their own image and earning a coherent construction 
of Self. This reveals an underlying logic, or a general expectation, amongst the Norwegian 
practitioners of the Barents-cooperation that it is Russia who should adapt to the liberal and 
democratic values the Norwegian practitioners themselves represent.    
The NBS intends to focus on what they perceive as apolitical and therefore uncomplicated. 
Clara said that:  
“We try to stay away from the politically complicated…Sports and culture are the 
fields that it is least complicated to facilitate cooperation because it isn’t so politically 
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laden or politically complicated. In that sense, it is important because it can serve as a 
catalyst for other types of activity – maybe you begin with culture and then move on to 
more difficult areas.” (Interview, 19/02) 
According to Clara, culture and sports are fields that are perceived as not “politically laden” 
and “politically uncomplicated”. As a consequence, it is those fields of cooperation that are 
most heavily funded. These fields also generally steer clear of ‘foreign agent’-legislation, as 
they are not considered political in the Russian context. As such, what may be termed the core 
activity of the Barents-cooperation remains unaffected by the repressive legislation on 
Russian NGOs. Yet, with the mandate of funding cooperation projects across the border, the 
NBS finds itself in a quandary due to the ‘foreign agent’-legislation. In fact, promoting liberal 
values and ideals such as democracy is according to Clara part of the NBS’ internal action 
plan: “In the action plan for 2020 it says that projects on civil society contributes to create 
active citizenship and provides the basis for and maintains democracy” (Email interview, 
15/06). While their letters of assignment from the MFA clearly states that funds should be 
directed towards civil society cooperation, Russian project partners risk being given the 
‘foreign agent’-label if they receive funds from the secretariat. Clara explained:  
“The NBS tries to manage the project funds in a way that avoids creating problems for 
the actors that receive the funding. For example, we never grant funds directly to 
Russian civil society organizations. That way we avoid them being affected by 
‘foreign agent’ legislation” (Interview, 19/02).  
Hence, the NBS has slightly altered its practices. While they do not send funds directly to 
Russian civil society organizations, NBS funds find their way to Russian organizations 
indirectly: 
“We do see however, that Russian organizations may indirectly receive funding from 
us through our Northern Norwegian actors transferring funds that are from our grants. 
Therefore, we have a clause in our grant letters, stipulating that contracts must be 
signed between the partners if our grants are to be transferred, and that we must 
approve these contracts. This allows us to influence and advise the partners on how to 
avoid problems for the Russian party.” (Interview, 19/02) 
However, the restrictions on civil society in Russia are not always circumvented. Clara refers 
to concrete examples: One where an environmental project was delayed due to extra 
paperwork amid fears of ramifications from ‘foreign agent’-labeling. Another where the 
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Norwegian organization FRI, often granted funds by the NBS, has reported of an increasingly 
repressive situation for the LGBT community in Russia – subsequently hampering 
possibilities for them to reach out the community and initiate cooperation. Clara said that,  
“Within civil society, environmental issues, NGOs working with sensitive topics like 
for example LGBT, and journalism, cooperation has become more difficult. People 
working within these fields are facing great challenges and experience that due to new 
laws on Russian side, cooperation is more complicated.” (Interview, 19/02 2020). 
This quote underlines the dominant representation of the Russian state-civil society 
relationship within the Barents-cooperation. The informants are in concurrence in their 
perception that Russian civil society is weakened by an oppressive and authoritative Russian 
state. They believe this has complicated civil-society cooperation across the border. 
According to Håvard, the experienced cooperation practitioner, “the foreign-agent law in 
Russia has made cooperation within civil society more difficult and complicated” (Interview 
07/02). Hence, the informants describe the “foreign agent”-legislation as an obstacle and a 
challenge that has made civil society cooperation “complicated”. This is expressed in the 
quotes above and is echoed by journalist and former deputy head of the NBS Thomas Nilsen: 
“It all started in 2012 when Putin was elected for the third time. After that the Barents-
cooperation changed character. […] Russia started clamping down on civil society with 
the famous ‘foreign-agent’-legislation. This quickly affected the Barents-cooperation. 11 
Russian NGOs that had been cooperating with corresponding Norwegian NGOs were 
given the foreign-agent mark.” (Interview, 14/02) 
Although the informants emphasize the ‘foreign agent’-legislation as a hindrance to people-
to-people cooperation, in practice the experience is often more nuanced. Within the fields of 
education and culture the informants explain that the cooperation is not affected by the 
politics surrounding the legislation. Pål sums up this perception: “Overall, education-
cooperation steers clear of authoritative turns in Russia. However, civil society movements 
are affected by the foreign agent legislation” (Interview, 28/02).  
Some informants uphold the idea that the ‘foreign-agent’-legislation is a hindrance to the 
Barents-cooperation but fail to come up with concrete examples. Marius, the informant from 
the NNEO, is convinced that the ‘foreign agent’-legislation has severely hampered the 
cooperation. Yet, when asked about concrete examples the only one that emerges is the case 
of Ølen Betong which is related to business and industry – fields that do not fall under the 
40 
 
civil society domain that the ‘foreign agent’ legislation pertains to15. Allegedly, Norwegian 
intelligence service tried to recruit two employees of Ølen Betong – a firm with factories in 
both the Norwegian and Russian part of the Barents-region. Although the employees declined 
the recruitment attempts, their contact with the Norwegian Intelligence service was enough 
for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) to expel them from Russia 
(Jentoft, 2017; Nordvåg & Wormdal, 2020). As such, the Ølen Betong-case was not related to 
the ‘foreign agent’-legislation at all, but to the Norwegian Intelligence Service attempts at 
recruiting spies from within the Barents-region. The lack of reference to concrete examples 
indicates that the discursive production of Russian civil society as increasingly vulnerable has 
become a dominant discourse. In other words, this is a narrative that has become an accepted 
“truth” that renders further scrutiny of specific situations – e.g. that of the Ølen Betong-case – 
unnecessary. 
While there is little doubt that the Russian civil society is maneuvering within a narrower 
space for agency, it is shaped by discursive production. Thus, we can reflect on and 
problematize the dominant construction of Russian civil society as vulnerable and weak. In a 
recent article, Stuvøy showed how Russian civil society activists carve out space for 
themselves from which they legitimize their position, despite repressive state legislation 
(Stuvøy, 2020, p.6). In her article, it becomes apparent how the EU through its civil society 
network ‘EU-Russia Civil Society Forum’ fails to identify this agency which Russian activists 
have and create amid state dominance (Stuvøy, 2020, p.18). Among the practitioners in the 
Barents-cooperation the dominant discourse on the Russian civil society similarly portrays it 
as weak, and as such disregards the innovative and strategic ways in which activists 
circumvent the repressive legislation and adapt their activities. In fact, there are also examples 
of NGOs participating in the Barents-cooperation (receiving funds from NBS) where 
adaptation and changes to organizational structure allowed the NGO to continue as before. 
For example, the environmental organization Bellona in Murmansk was addressed by 
informants. The focus was how they were subject to the ‘foreign agent’-label, not on how they 
strategically adapted by re-organizing “along new bureaucratic lines” and thus retained their 
activities in Murmansk (Digges, 2019). Following this, I ask how the dominant portrayal of 
civil society development in Russia reflects on the identity of the Barents-cooperation. 
 
15 Interview 22/04 
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From a discursive analytical standpoint, as the informants describe the Russian state-civil 
society relationship, they sub-consciously produce an image of Self. They express a belief that 
through the different cooperation projects with Russian civil society, the Barents-cooperation 
is supporting the Russian civil society repressed by the authoritative Russian state. Here, the 
informant’s discourse on Russian civil society is constructing an idea of the Self as supporters 
of the ‘weak’ Russian civil society.  
When asked why it is important for the NBS to fund civil society cooperation between 
Norwegian and Russian actors, Håvard answered: 
“To us, it is important to retain a broad civil society cooperation across the borders. 
Therefore, it is important to us that it is possible for Russians to be able to spend time 
doing activities they’re interested in. In the Norwegian society there’s a broad civil 
society – and we want them to be able to cooperate with Russian people who share 
similar interests. It gives more breadth to the cooperation that it also includes Russian 
civil society. Our opinion is that it is valuable having space to talk about societal 
topics that the people living there are occupied with” (Email interview, 15/06) 
Hence, with the objective of retaining a “broad civil society cooperation” the NBS seeks to 
facilitate for Russians to be able to do “activities they’re interested in”. Following how their 
action plan gives the NBS mandate to facilitate democracy, their support of Russian civil 
society is justified. A similar tendency is expressed by the MFA source. When asked about 
what challenges the Barents-cooperation is facing the MFA source immediately mentions 
challenges with Russian civil society, emphasizing it as something the Norwegian MFA try to 
direct focus towards through their chairmanship in BEAC. Moreover, perceptions and 
constructions of the Russian civil society are expressed by juxtaposing it with the Self (here: 
Norwegian civil society). For example, the theater practitioner Nina said that, “We belong to 
the free field; no such thing exists in Russia” (Interview, 19/02). As such, constructing the 
Russian civil society as the Other situated in an illiberal political and societal context, the 
informants construct a Self, situated in a liberal political and societal context, as the supporter 
of the Other. 
Moreover, a recurring theme in the interviews with people working within the formalized 
Barents-cooperation is the telling of success-stories. While the informants reveal how the 
telling of success-stories is a conscious tactic when promoting the cooperation, they also turn 
to success-stories in my interviews with them. Thus, the success stories also serve as a 
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discursive production of Self. For example, when talking about authoritative turns in Russia, 
Håvard mentions BarentsPress as a successful project16. BarentsPress is an organization 
funded by the NBS where journalist from across the Barents-region participates. He adds that, 
due to the anti-liberal legislation and difficult situation for journalists in Russia, cooperation 
that includes civil-society and journalism is especially challenging. BarentsPress is therefore a 
project that directly challenges the difficulties of being a journalist in Russia by encouraging 
and supporting Russian journalism. It is represented as a successful project of cross-border 
cooperation despite a difficult context in Russia. This way, the NBS emerges from the 
‘politically uncomplicated’ by promoting a set of liberal values.  
The differentiation between the liberal Self and the Russian state is also an important identity 
dynamic I draw from the interviews. Mayor of Sør-Varanger Rune Rafaelsen, a key local 
actor, furthers the dominant representation of the Russian civil society as weak or even non-
existent: “Everything that has to do with civil society in Russia has gone wrong. The critical 
press is gone, the workers unions that used to be so strong are pulverized… many cases like 
these.” (Interview, 21/02). However, he believes “the stupidest thing you can do in 
international cooperation is taking a moralizing attitude” (Interview, 21/02). Instead, as is 
consistent with most of the informants, Rafaelsen directs focus towards how the Barents-
cooperation continues to be a constructive force despite political and societal differences 
between Norway and Russia:  
“Unfortunately, they’ll never be like us. The longest political journey you can embark 
upon in Europe today is from Kirkenes to Murmansk – politically, historically, 
socially, economically… there are major differences. But the Barents-cooperation has 
made it easier, it has created a foundation. I don’t think there’s a Norwegian politician 
with as much contact with Russia as I have.” (Interview, 21/02) 
In this statement, Rafaelsen establishes that the differences between Russia and Norway are 
too big for them to ever be alike. He indicates that the idea of Russia transforming towards 
Western ideals is unrealistic, and therefore differences need to be accepted. The mayor seems 
to neglect how Russia in the early 1990s embarked on a capitalist transformation and also 
how changes to Russian foreign policy approach in the Arctic opening for cooperation. As 
seen in chapter four, was a factor in making the formalization of the Barents-cooperation 
possible. Importantly, the emphasis on the differences between “us” and “them” serves as a 
 
16 Interview, 07/02 
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construction of a radical Other – in this case the Russian state. And instead of “taking a 
moralizing attitude” towards this radical Other, the cooperation in and through its cooperative 
practice facilitates collaboration despite the “political, historical, social, economic” 
differences, according to the mayor. In that way, Rafaelsen manifests his primary concern: 
that the Barents-cooperation remains a platform that makes dialogue with Russia possible. 
Whereas some of the informants emphasize how the Barents-cooperation through its support 
of the Russian civil society indirectly challenges what they perceive as an authoritative and 
illiberal Russian state, journalist Thomas Nilsen believes that Norwegian actors and the 
Barents cooperation should take on a more proactive and outspoken role against how the 
Russian state operates. This stands in stark contrast to Rafaelsen’s pragmatic approach of not 
taking a “moralizing attitude” towards Russia. Nilsen’s concern is how the change in Russian 
policy towards civil society has fundamentally changed the character of the Barents-
cooperation: “What is left of the cooperation is the official structures – the county council’s 
cooperation, the foreign ministers, the working groups – but there’s little left of the people-to-
people aspect” (Interview, 14/02). Therefore, he argues that Norway and the Barents-
cooperation should critique human-rights violations and weaknesses in the Russian 
democracy – meaning the emergence of an authoritative Russian state. If not, he fears, the 
Barents-cooperation may no longer be what he believes it was intended to be:   
“Regional leaders and institutions have a twisted understanding of the Barents-
cooperation as something that should only reflect what is good. However, if you 
neglect what is not so good [about Russian politics], you’re walking off a cliff, which I 
think is what we see today. I mean, it can’t be the Russian intelligence service 
dictating who can participate in the Barents-cooperation.” (Interview, 14/02) 
Nilsen believes there is a tendency to direct focus towards positive sides of the cooperation 
rather than address what is problematic. The tendency to direct focus towards the positives is 
also evident in my interviews with practitioners, as illustrated throughout chapter 5.1 and 
exemplified in this subchapter by the informants use of success stories. Nilsen indicates that 
the Russian intelligence service is interfering with the way the cooperation is run by dictating 
who are allowed participate. Furthermore, he states that regional leaders and the Barents-
institutions in Norway through their fixation on highlighting “only what is good” neglect how 
authoritative turns in Russia inflict upon the Barents-cooperation. By focusing on negative 
aspects to how the cooperation has developed in face of authoritative turns in Russia, Nilsen 
gives a more dramatic meaning to the developments in domestic Russian politics than the 
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other informants. He represents the deteriorating state-civil society relationship in Russia as a 
threat to Norwegian actors’ agency in the Barents-cooperation and expresses concerns with 
the lack of opposition to this tendency from the institutions and owners (the counties) of the 
Barents-cooperation.  
To exemplify the development he is describing, Nilsen refers to his own experience of how 
Russian officials have interfered with Norwegian Barents institutions. Back in 2014 when 
Russia annexed Crimea, the online newspaper The Barents Observer was a part of the NBS 
and as such incorporated into the official structures of the Barents-cooperation funded by the 
MFA. But after publishing an article using the word “annexation” about Russia’s actions in 
Crimea, The Barents Observer and Nilsen was accused by Russia’s Kirkenes-based consul 
general, Mikhail Noskov, of damaging bilateral relations between Norway and Russia. In 
Noskov’s view, the fact that the The Barents Observer was part of the MFA-funded NBS 
meant that it was a mouthpiece for the Norwegian government, and therefore the article was 
damaging. Subsequently, the owners of the NBS (and The Barents Observer), the three county 
councils, decided that the newspaper should not be allowed to write anything that could harm 
bilateral relations. Nilsen protested and was fired for “disloyalty” (Pedersen, 2014; Mathiesen, 
2015) 17. Shortly after this dramatic sequence of events, Nilsen and his two co-journalists 
moved into an office space across the street from the NBS and established The Independent 
Barents Observer.  
Education practitioner Pål also mentioned the Barents Observer-case and expressed a similar 
concern to that of Nilsen:  
“In my opinion, the situation we had with Thomas Nilsen and the Barents-Observer 
was an expression of the limits to the autonomy of the Barents-cooperation. In that 
case, the owners of the Barents secretariat were very clear that they want the Barents-
cooperation and region to function as an obedient tool. I mean, perhaps the strongest 
signals came from Finnmark county.” (Interview, 28/02) 
To Pål and Nilsen, the Barents Observer-case reflects how the authoritative Russian state is 
not only repressing civil society and journalists in Russia, but that it also tries to do so in 
Norway. Due to lack of opposition to this development from the formal Barents institutions 
they believe the autonomy of the cooperation is limited. In this case, an online newspaper 
 
17 This story is a combination of Nilsen’s retelling in the interview (19/02/2020) and reporting on the situation in 
the referenced news articles.  
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reporting independent news within the formalized Barents-cooperation structure was canceled 
as a result, re-opening as an independent news agency under the “vær-varsom-poster” 18.  
The discourse on the ‘foreign agent’-legislation uncovered in this subchapter serves a specific 
purpose by giving meaning to a development in Russian politics and society. It reveals an 
identity dynamic from which the informants legitimize their foreign policy practice when 
faced with the challenge of an authoritative Russian state. This follows the idea of Hansen 
(2006), that foreign policy discourses draw on references to identities in their legitimization of 
the policy. Here, ideas about the Russian civil society are articulated where the Russian state 
is seen as strong and authoritative and the Russian civil society as weak, vulnerable or even 
non-existing. In that way, the dominant discourse on the Russian state-civil society 
relationship constructs two Others: a radical Other in the authoritative Russian state, and a 
weak and vulnerable Other in the Russian civil society. A Self is simultaneously constructed – 
an idea that “we” are the liberal supporters of the threatened Russian civil society. This 
Self/Other dynamic, where the Norwegian practitioners in the cooperation construe 
themselves as supporters of groups in Russia they perceive of as weak and threatened, is also 
a way in which their foreign policy practice and the Barents-cooperation is legitimized.  
Moreover, the identity dynamics uncovered in this subchapter illustrates an underlying logic 
within the Barents-cooperation. While not all of the informants articulate it explicitly, the 
discourse reveals that the Norwegian side of the cooperation have constructed an identity of 
themselves as upholding liberal values as opposed to the Russian state. By discursively 
producing the Russian civil society as weak and vulnerable while simultaneously promoting 
liberal values through their support to it, the NBS takes on a political role, justified by an 
“apolitical” commitment to democracy. Mayor Rafaelsen maintains a pragmatic approach to 
Russia, rejecting what he calls “taking a moralizing attitude” but at the same time he said that 
“unfortunately, Russia will never be like us” -  indicating that Russia becoming more like 
“us” would be for the better. Journalist Nilsen wants the Barents-cooperation to be more 
direct in its opposition to authoritative and illiberal developments in Russian politics and 
society. This is the underlying logic amongst the practitioners in the Barents-cooperation, or 
background knowledge as termed by Pouliot (2010) due to its common-sensical nature, that 
Russia are the ones who needs to adapt to “our” liberal values.  
 
18 “Vær-varsom-plakaten” is a list of ethical guidelines for the Norwegian press. 
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This logic demonstrates a link between the Barents-cooperation and the logic of the post-cold 
war world order as understood by Richard Sakwa in his book Russia against the rest: The 
post-cold war crisis of world order (2017). Sakwa argues that the West and Russia failed to 
create an inclusive peace order after the end of the Cold War. The Western community 
perceived themselves as the winners of the Cold war and therefore the Western liberal order 
as ideologically superior (Sakwa, 2017, p. 4). It was expected that Russia, “the looser” of the 
cold war, would adapt to the ideals of this liberal order. Therefore, a logic prevailed where the 
West stayed the same and grew larger, while Russia was expected to change “to reflect the 
assumed new power and normative realities” (Sakwa, 2017, p.6). According to Sakwa it is 
due to this logic that the Western-Russian relationship “went full circle and ended up where it 
begun” with confrontation and division as the core characteristics (2017, p. 10). It is this same 
logic that the informants express – that only the Russian party in this multilateral cooperation 
should change and adopt the values of its western counterparts.  
Finally, two of the informants refer to the story of The Barents Observer in order to express a 
concern over what they perceive as a lack of direct opposition within the Barents-cooperation 
to the developments in Russian politics. Thus, questions about the autonomy of the Barents-
cooperation are raised. As we shall see in the following subchapter, the importance of 
autonomy is emphasized as attention is directed towards matters related to the Norwegian 
government’s foreign policy practice. This reveals frictions between the Norwegian center 
and periphery as practical examples of interstate tension is discussed.  
5.3 Frictions between center and periphery 
In the interviews, both the Frode Berg-case and the Norwegian intelligence service Fokus-
2020 report were common talking points. Frode Berg is a Norwegian citizen who was arrested 
by the FSB for espionage, the other is an annual public document by the Norwegian 
intelligence service on current security threats to Norway. While these two cases are in many 
ways dissimilar, the informants would often talk about them interchangeably: they are used by 
the informants as examples of what they perceive as a challenge to the Barents-cooperation 
and the amicable cross-border relations it hinges on; a tendency where interstate tension 
inflicts upon and impedes cooperation. This illustrate how interstate tensions leads to frictions 
between the practitioners of the Barents-cooperation and the Norwegian government and its 
pragmatic approach to Russia. The objective here is to understand the reactions to the Frode 
Berg-case and the Fokus 2020-report by drawing on representations of the Self and the Other. 
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Hence, in this subchapter I address identity dynamics in a Norwegian context that inform how 
practitioners view Norwegian foreign policy in this time of geopolitical tension. 
In 2017 Frode Berg was arrested by the FSB, suspected of espionage. Prior to his arrest, Berg 
had for years been an active practitioner of the Barents-cooperation and familiar face in the 
local community of Kirkenes. He had been working as border inspector (Norwegian-Russian 
border) for 24 years, been involved in several Barents-cooperation projects, and since 2016 
been board member in the art and culture organization “Pikene På Broen” - sponsored by the 
NBS (Holmes, Skjetne & Sandblad, 2018). In April 2019 he was convicted to 14 years of 
prison for espionage by the Moscow City Court. Berg was released in November the same 
year as part of a spy exchange agreement between Lithuania and Russia that saw him returned 
to Norway. Ever since the arrest, the case has caught popular interests and gained substantial 
coverage in Norwegian and international media. It was a case reminiscent of Cold War 
tactics, and it impacted the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia (Vestvik & 
Rosenby, 2019, p.6). 
There is a broad concurrence amongst the informants that the Norwegian media’s portrayal of 
Kirkenes, the border region, and Russia amid the Berg-case is unnuanced. They especially 
express discontent in how the media portrays Kirkenes as a ‘spy-nest’: 
 “I think an unbalanced image is portrayed in the media. Although, I fully understand 
why. Online newspapers are dependent on clicks and why would anyone want to read 
about the jolly Barents-cooperation when they can read about ‘the spy Frode Berg’ 
and ‘the spy-nest Kirkenes’? That’s what sells, but it paints an unbalanced and 
unnuanced picture.” (Anonymous 1, 20/02) 
Hence, there is a belief that the focus of the media and the popular perception south of the 
border region amid the Forde Berg-case is unbalanced. That they are guided by headlines that 
sell rather than focusing on the importance of the strong relationship and cooperation between 
the locals around the border. Adding to the dissatisfaction with media portrayal, are reactions 
to the strategy of the Norwegian intelligence service to recruit from the local population. 
Knut, the sports cooperation-practitioner, believes that the Norwegian intelligence service is 
making a mistake when recruiting agents from within the Barents-cooperation. Doing so, he 
believes, creates conflict within the cooperation and serves to undermine the friendships that 
have been established between people across the border. The fear is that cases like this will 
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lead to suspicion towards cooperation practitioners and thus jeopardize the trust and 
friendships that have been built in the region19.  
In February 2020, a year after Frode Berg was released, the Norwegian intelligence service 
released its annual report of current security threats to Norway and its interests – Fokus 2020. 
What arguably got the most attention in the media was how the intelligence service viewed 
the Russian threat to Norway. It was reported, as it has been in previous Fokus-reports (Rowe, 
2018), that Russia seeks to reinforce conflicting perceptions between northern and southern 
parts of the country, and between Oslo and the districts, in their view of Russia. The report 
states that Russian authorities hope to influence political processes and public opinions in 
Norway: 
 “[Russian] influence operations may be intended to undermine the public’s trust in 
election processes, the authorities, politicians or the media. The intention may also be to 
steer the public debate in a specific direction, sow doubt regarding facts or discredit 
specific opinions, thereby undermining the foundation of trust on which democratic 
processes rely” (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2020, p.69) 
The informants express frustration over these threat assessments. Two days after the public 
presentation of the Fokus 2020-report, mayor Rafaelsen expressed his dissatisfaction in the 
Norwegian newspaper ‘Klassekampen’: “This means that anyone who wants good and close 
cooperation with Russia is perceived as a tool for the Kremlin.”20 (Lysberg & Kristiansen, 
2020). Nine days later, in his interview with me, Rafaelsen said that he does not  
“[…] agree with the threat perception reflected in the intelligence report. […] Those of 
us who seek dialogue with Russia can now be labeled as useful idiots, hybrid agents 
for Russia. You become a victim of suspicion. Up here, I’m surrounded by what the 
intelligence service sees as Norway’s main enemy – Russia. It complicates 
cooperation because among other things it may affect border-crossing and visa policy” 
(Interview, 21/02). 
Most of the informants align with the mayor and express frustration over the perception of 
Russia in the report. Importantly, the frustration is not limited to the threat perceptions 
articulated in the report. Rather, it follows the same idea expressed in relation to the media 
and the Frode Berg-case; that ‘outsiders’ construct an unambiguous representation of Russia 
 
19 Interview, 08/06 
20 My translation of Rafaelsen’s statement in Klassekampen. 
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and subsequently Norwegians who work and cooperate across the border. The fear of 
suspicion is expressed, which in turn, Rafaelsen anticipates, could affect border-crossings. 
Knut, who expresses strong support of Rafaelsen, is of the opinion that the perception of 
Russian actions, articulated in the report, is outright wrong. To him, the Frode Berg-case 
proves that it is more the other way around – that the Norwegian intelligence service is more 
active in their influence schemes than the Russian21. These reactions illustrate frictions and 
disagreements between practitioners in the Barents-cooperation and the foreign policy 
practice of Norwegian central authorities. As we shall see, the way the informants reflect on 
these two cases reveals a domestic Self/Other dynamic.  
Following Hansen (2006), ideas of the Self are dependent on the constructions of Other(s). 
This was apparent in the previous subchapter when the informants reflected on their own role 
vis-à-vis Russian actors. When the informants directed attention to the two cases discussed in 
this subchapter, they constructed a relational identity dynamic within a Norwegian context. 
The Self constructed here is dependent on a construction of a “southern” Other situated in the 
Norwegian capital and as such a center of power. In the interviews, the construct and 
categorization of a “southern” Other differs between “people in Oslo” to simply “people in 
the south”. A couple of the informants would say “you”, referring to me the interviewer, as a 
representative of the south or of Oslo when talking about the center-periphery dynamic. For 
example, on informant said: “It may be hard for you coming up here to understand, but we 
have a different understanding of Russia than what you have in the south” (Anonymous 1, 
20/02). What is essential here, is what ideas of the Self the construction of a “southern” Other 
articulates. Identifying the idea of a “northern” Self in relation to the “southern” Other is 
essential to understand the reactions to both the Frode Berg-case and the Fokus 2020-report.   
To the informants, the threat perception of Russia articulated in the report comes down to a 
lack of understanding of Russia. According to mayor Rafaelsen, this can be explained by 
proximity to the Russian border: “The fear of Russia is inversely proportional the further 
away from the border you get.” (Interview, 21/02). Hence, the “southern” Other is 
constructed as having an unreasonable fear of Russia. A fear that is due to the lack of 
knowledge and experience the “southern” Other has of Russia, as opposed to the “northern” 
Self. This identity construction through differentiation between the Self and the Other is 
evident in the two following quotes, the first from theatre and culture expert Nina: 
 
21 Interview, 08/06 
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“Now that there’s been a lot of focus on espionage, and how Kirkenes is a spy-nest… I 
think that is rather unfortunate. I think it’s a one-sided focus. But it’s obviously more 
intriguing with a spy-story than a story about how we make kids interact across the 
border. However, I think a more nuanced image is important. I’m especially thinking 
about the headlines in the newspapers. But if you’ve never been to the North it is hard 
to understand how the geography up here works. We are so close to Russia; you can 
literally walk over.” (Interview, 19/02)  
“The unbalanced portrayal of Russia in the media is problematic. Especially for those 
who do not have the same preconditions as us living up here [at the border], and work 
with Russia daily, to understand what’s written in the media. For example, people 
living in Oslo where Russia is distant. For us it’s close.” (Anonymous 1, 20/02) 
In similar veins, and showcasing the discrepancy between local and media perceptions of 
Russia, Knut sums up his feelings:“Up here we just laugh at the media’s framing of Russia. 
[…] They sit in Oslo and write about things they don’t understand” (Interview, 8/06). This 
way, the informants justify their roles as foreign policy practitioners by reference to their 
unique understanding of Russia and relationship with Russians. And they continuously do this 
by juxtaposing their own understanding of Russia with the “southern” Other’s lack of 
understanding.  
Hence, the ‘Northern’ Self is characterized as someone who knows and, at least in a 
Norwegian context, has a unique relationship with the “the Russian”. Here, history is essential 
to understand this relationship. A shared history of friendly contact across the border 
facilitates a narrative that “we know each other, we trust each other, and we need each other”. 
Through cooperation over many years and geographic proximity, the threat perception is 
different in the North than what it is South, according to project and culture expert Clara: “I 
believe the cross-border contact between people in Northern Norway and Northwest Russia 
has given people up here a much more positive attitude towards Russia, as opposed to the 
skepticism we see further South in Norway.” (Interview, 19/02). A key historical point of 
reference is the Russian liberation of Northern Norway during World War II, as expressed by 
theater and culture practitioner Nina:  
“I think the people-to-people cooperation works because the border has always been 
here, we’ve always known that we must get along. We were liberated by the Russians 
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half a year before the rest of Norway. That experience is stuck in the parent and 
grandparent generations, and it is inherited in the families up here” (Interview, 19/02) 
This way historical roots are used to say something about the unique understanding the people 
of Finnmark have of Russia and is a central ingredient in the construction of the Norwegian 
Barents-identity. 
Through reference to history, the discourse constructed within the Barents-cooperation in 
relation to the cases discussed in this subchapter, constructs a northern Norwegian Self and a 
Russian Other that over time have become less different. A process that was also referred to in 
chapter 5.1, where the informants emphasized the Barents-cooperation as a security 
mechanism by creating generations of friends across the border. Education practitioner Pål, 
sees this process of normalization as a direct consequence of the cross-border cooperation and 
shared experiences: “I’ve witnessed a normalization of ‘the Russian’. Both the perception 
people have of ‘the Russian’ at the other side of the border, but also as ‘the Russian’ has 
become a part of us.” (Interview, 28/02). This normalization in which ‘the Russian’ becomes 
‘a part of us’ follows an idea that common identity has been fostered through a long history of 
cooperation. In this case, it is Pål’s experience that years of cooperation across the border has 
wiped out prejudice and animosity, and in fact, made the Northern Norwegian (Kirkenes) Self 
and the Russian Other less different. This relationship and the shared history are celebrated 
and reproduced in various ways. For example, during the World War II liberation 
anniversaries as well as cultural events and cross-border festivals such as the Pomor Festival 
in Vardø and the Barents Spektakel in Kirkenes. These events can be seen as (discursive) 
practices, routinely, e.g. annually, promoting and reproducing the unique cross border 
relationship and identity. 
Thereby, the Frode Berg-case served as a disruption to the idea of Self and its relationship 
with the Russian Other constructed within the Barents-cooperation. In Kirkenes, the “Barents-
Capital”, the case brought the Norwegian foreign policy practice of espionage into a 
cooperative “Barents sphere” that is supposed to be almost exclusively about unity and 
cooperation. It stood in stark contrast to the symbolic gestures of friendship often conveyed in 
the Barents-region. The fact that Berg was not only a local from Kirkenes, but also a 
practitioner of the Barents-cooperation further strengthened this disruption. In their discursive 
justification of the Barents-cooperation after 2014, discussed in chapter 5.1, the informants 
expressed satisfaction with how the Norwegian government remained outspoken in their 
support of the cooperation after 2014. However, as we have seen here, when the colder 
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political climate post 2014 is linked with more concrete events, the informants represent 
Norwegian government foreign policy actions as a challenge to the Barents-cooperation. 
Through the Frode Berg-case and the threat perception of Russia in the Fokus 2020 report, the 
informants see their position as foreign policy practitioners as undermined.  
As was established in chapter two, discourses include some and simultaneously exclude 
others. This is the case in the practitioners’ discourse following the two cases discussed here. 
The identity dynamic uncovered here, constructs the Self as more competent to understand 
and work with Russia than the “southern” Other. Hence, the reference to identity-dynamics 
serves as a legitimization and reproduction of the foreign policy authority of the practitioners. 
Yet, this is a point of frustration because central power resides outside of the Barents-region, 
or more specifically in Oslo. In that way, the center-periphery-divide addresses an uneven 
power-dynamic. The “southern” Other situated in the center is perceived as wielding 
national/governmental/media power. Thus, when the government’s, the “southern” Other’s, 
foreign policy practices does not reflect the amicable and friendly cross-border relations of the 
cooperation but rather risks jeopardizing it, the informants react by discursively constructing a 
divide between themselves (the local) and the national.  
Following from how the informants reflects on the two cases discussed in this subchapter, the 
politics of the Barents-cooperation is made visible. It illustrating how interests and opinions 
about Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia is articulated within the Barents-cooperation. 
This is also apparent as the informants underline the importance of the people living nearby 
the border being allowed to maintain friendly relations. They believe this has traditionally 
been part of Norwegian foreign policy. This was explicitly articulated by education-
practitioner Pål:  
“It is obvious [that there exists a North/South divide]. I guess it has always been there. 
Already in 1905 there was talk of the “Russian threat”. It’s a threat perception that is 
inherited in Norwegian foreign policy. However, there is a tradition that people living 
close to each other are allowed to perceive one another as neighbors, and not as 
enemies. That is probably the case up here [in Kirkenes].” (Interview, 28/02) 
In this quote, Pål explains how Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia has traditionally 
worked well for the people living close to the Russian border. Whereas threat perceptions of 
Russia have always been embedded in Norwegian foreign policy, Pål believes that they in 
Kirkenes have been allowed to nurture a more friendly relationship. In that way, especially 
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the Frode Berg-case is seen as a deviation from the traditional Norwegian foreign policy 
practice. Theatre and culture practitioner Nina expressed a similar idea:  
“Of course, every country needs to have an intelligence service. It’s just that we live so 
extremely close to a superpower, but I can’t get myself to see that as threatening, I 
can’t. I get that we need to have intelligence services, but there also needs to live 
people here [at the border], and therefore we need cooperation.” (Interview, 19/02) 
Thus, both Nina and Pål express a general support of the broader lines in Norwegian foreign 
policy towards Russia. However, in their reflections over the cases discussed in this 
subchapter, they express a concern that the current interstate tension is leading to a change in 
Norwegian foreign policy – a change where the practitioners ability to foster cross-border 
cooperation is hampered.  
Journalist Nilsen has a similar concern. He believes that both the Frode Berg-case and The 
Barents Observer-case, outlined in chapter 5.2, illustrates how the autonomy of the Barents-
cooperation have been limited due to interstate-tension22. Whether it is Russian or Norwegian 
authorities who through their actions undermines the Barents-cooperation and the 
practitioners foreign policy practice, the general argument is to maintain and strengthen the 
autonomy of the cooperation. Education-practitioner Pål adhered: 
“There needs to be autonomy in the Barents-cooperation allowing for it to persist 
despite a deteriorating relationship between Norwegian and Russian governments. 
That is essential, because that way the Barents-cooperation functions as a channel 
where dialogue can continue at several levels.” (Interview, 28/02) 
As such, similarly to how the informants revived justification of the cooperation in relation to 
the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Pål argues that the Barents-cooperation is a facilitator for 
dialogue. As we saw in chapter 5.1, according to the informants it is the cooperation’s unique 
ability to facilitate dialogue despite geopolitical tension that has enabled it to retain its 
activities as well, as expressions of support from the Norwegian government. They argue that 
if the Barents-cooperation does not retain autonomy, but rather becomes too controlled by 
either government, or interstate tension, it will struggle to maintain its function as a platform 
for dialogue. In that way, they see interstate tension as limiting the ability of the cooperation 
to act independently of a deteriorating interstate relationship.  
 
22 Interview, 14/02, Kirkenes 
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Ultimately, the reactions to both cases follows a similar identity-dynamic where the 
construction of a “northern” Self with a unique relationship and understanding of the “the 
Russian” stands in stark contrast to the “southern” Other’s misrepresentation of Russia and 
the Barents-region. References to a Barents-identity or a “northern” Self, juxtaposed to the 
“southern” Other, serves as a legitimization of the practitioners’ foreign policy authority. This 
is because the Self is construed as having a knowledge and understanding of Russia superior 
to that of the Other. Moreover, to the informants the Norwegian governments’ foreign policy 
practice in relation to these two cases indicates a deviation from traditional foreign policy 
where Norwegians and Russians have been allowed to see each other first and foremost as 
neighbors. Thus, the friction between the center and periphery, or the local and national, 
discussed in this subchapter makes the politics of the Barents-cooperation visible. From the 
perspective of the informants the Frode Berg-case and perceptions of Russia in the “Fokus 
2020”-report are understood as the “southern” Other (i.e. Norwegian government and 
intelligence service) mismanaging Norway’s relationship with Russia. Reacting to this 
tendency, some of the informants produce a regional autonomy-argument, stipulating that the 
“northern” Self with all her/his competence should be allowed to coexist, and manage 
relations with the Russian neighbor, unaffected by interstate tension. In the following 
subchapter, we shall see how politics becomes increasingly visible when the Barents-
cooperation emerges as an additional regional political actor in the Arctic region. 
5.4 The agency of the Barents-cooperation  
The increasing international interest in the Arctic region emerged as a topic in the interviews 
as the informants continued to legitimize the cooperation in light of the geopolitics that 
surrounds it. As the polar ice cap is melting, the Arctic is gaining increasing geostrategic 
interest in recent years, due to its vast natural resources and potential trade routes. This is a 
part of regionalization of international politics and opportunistic approach to the Arctic as a 
potential new source of oil and gas extraction. The increased international interest in the 
Arctic situates the Barents-cooperation within an emerging marketplace attracting the interest 
of actors with competing interests and values. This includes an array of actors - not reserved 
to the major powers of US, Russia, and China. Also, the EU has in recent years directed its 
focus in the Arctic to the Barents region (Biedermann, 2019). Similarly, Norway has interests 
in the region due to its coastal line to the Barents Sea, their archipelago Svalbard located in 
the Arctic ocean, resource interests, and significant share of population living above the 
Arctic circle (Brøther, 2013). And as mentioned in chapter four, the ‘High North’ was given 
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top national priority by the red/green Norwegian government in 2005 (Jensen, 2012, p.81). 
Here, we shall see how the Barents-cooperation and promotion of it becomes a tool in the 
pursuit of regional (and national) development ambitions by the informants closest to policy 
elites. By linking the Barents-cooperation to increased interest in the Arctic, the informants 
emphasize what they see as its strengths, and reconstruct its purpose as possibilities for 
economic growth arise. In that way, the Barents-cooperation emerges as an additional 
political actor in the Arctic with its own agency. 
To some of the informants, the increasing international interest in the Arctic justifies 
promoting and informing about the Barents-cooperation in Brussels. For example, Marius, the 
informant from the NNEO, explained that a core reason for why it is important to do so is to 
show that Arctic states are cooperating:  
“One of the main reasons making it important to promote the Barents-cooperation in 
Brussels is in relation to geopolitics and arctic policy. A lot of people perceive of the 
Arctic as one of the last pristine areas in the world, thinking that it’s an area where 
vast resources will become available when the ice melts, that no one owns any of these 
resources and that there will be a resource-race, a gold rush, in order to get to the 
resources first. It is seen as an area without law and order. What we want to show is 
that the arctic states take responsibility and cooperate well, that people in the region 
cooperate, and that it is an area with sovereign states with harbors” (Interview, 22/04). 
The motivation for promoting the Barents-cooperation in Brussels, according to this 
informant, is driven by a set of assumptions about what “a lot of people think”. Here, the 
Barents-cooperation serves as a tool in order to debunk myths about the Arctic region or what 
Marius believes are misrepresentations of the Arctic - for example that it is “an area without 
law and order” - and to establish Arctic states presence in the region. Maruis also told about 
how they focus on success-stories of people to people contact and collaboration to emphasize 
the amicable relations across the border23. Moreover, due to the worsened Western-Russian 
relationship amid the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the international focus and interest in the 
Arctic serves as a relevant context from which to promote cooperation in the region. The 
MFA source told a similar story of how increased international interest in the Arctic has made 
emphasizing cooperation in the region increasingly important:    
 
23 Interview, 22/04 
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“The interest in the Arctic is increasing. Many countries are writing Arctic strategies, 
many have a lot to say about the Arctic, and many fear conflict – race for the Arctic, 
war in the Arctic – there’s been many conferences on that. In that context, peace and 
cooperation is important. So, when talking to international colleagues about the Arctic, 
our foreign minister and our prime minister always mention the Barents-cooperation, 
what it is like to be neighbor with Russia, and how the Barents-cooperation is an 
instrument to handle a complicated neighbor.” (Interview, 03/03). 
In the context of increased interest and narratives about insecurity in the Arctic, the Barents-
cooperation is constructed as a successful example of multilateral (practical) cooperation, 
enhancing peace and security. As such, a similar discursive justification of the cooperation 
that was identified in relation to increased geopolitical tension amid 2014 and authoritative 
turns in Russia, is evident here. However, as we shall see, in relation to new economic 
opportunities in the Arctic, the Barents-cooperation and its success-stories are tools in order to 
advance (Northern) Norwegian development ambitions in the Arctic.  
The informants operating within the official structures of the cooperation, and those with 
official political mandates, construct an Arctic exploitation-argument when linking the 
Barents-cooperation to the Arctic. This argument pertains to the possibilities of resource 
exploitation in the region – as mentioned, the central reason for its increased international 
interest. The exploitation of oil and gas in the Arctic is a sensitive and highly political topic, 
where environmental concerns are competing with the lure of economic growth and 
development. As we saw in chapter four, there is simultaneously a security aspect, as 
references to security have been made part of the official government discourse Norwegian 
legitimizing its ambitions in the region (Jensen, 2012).  
In the context of international interest in the Arctic and a melting ice cap, mayor Rafaelsen 
sees great potential for Kirkenes to profit from it. According to Rafaelsen, the Barents-
cooperation is “the best security mechanism [foreign minister] Eriksen Søreide and [minister 
of defense] Frank Bakke Jensen has” (Interview, 21/02). Therefore, in his opinion, the best 
thing that could happen is “big, complex industrial cooperation between Russia and Norway. 
Maybe combined with large western companies, for example Equinor, Total, Exxon, etc. 
Norway is a small country, we are dependent on having international arrangements” 
(Interview, 21/02). Moreover, Rafaelsen states that: 
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“We [Kirkenes] have national strategic significance and therefore cooperation with 
Russia is detrimental as the northern sea route develops, cooperating also with South 
Korea, Japan and China, to establish a major harbor here [in Kirkenes] combined with 
a railway to Rovaniemi. The Barents-cooperation is the facilitator making this 
possible.” (Interview, 21/02) 
Thinking back to the establishment of the Barents-cooperation (chapter four) and how one of 
the motivations was creating a region for economic exchange and evening out socio-economic 
differences, the mayor sees profit-making as the key driver for long-term stability in the 
region. To Rafaelsen the initial economic development aspect of the Barents-cooperation has 
changed in the context of a melting North Pole, as new possibilities for economic and 
industrial development has emerged. While the cooperation is promoted to EU-diplomats as a 
small-scale people-to-people cooperation, a key regional actor such as Rafaelsen promotes 
Norwegian-Russian partnership through “big”, or large-scale, industrial cooperation and sees 
the Barents-cooperation as a facilitator for this type of development. As the mayor also said, 
“The Barents-cooperation is the starting point for everything we do here!” (Interview, 21/02). 
This understanding of the cooperation, constructed by the mayor, is used to articulate his own 
political development ambitions for the region and Kirkenes. Environmental concerns, also 
one of the outspoken issue areas upon the establishment of the Barents-cooperation, is never 
mentioned by the mayor.  
From Rafaelsen’s point of view, the melting polar ice cap, a direct result of climate change, 
facilitates a situation where growth-oriented models of development can finally reach a 
regional apogee. This expresses an opportunistic adaptation, in which the opportunities for 
economic growth arising from climate change are promoted at the expense of measures 
addressing its causes (Kristoffersen, 2015). Interestingly, Rafaelsen’s ambitions are in line 
with Russia’s plan for Arctic development, as a new Arctic strategy was signed in March 
202024. The strategy, which includes Russia’s main objectives in the region, states ambitions 
of major resource exploitation and development of the Northern Sea Route (Staalesen, 2020). 
Håvard aligns with the Arctic exploitation-argument, and argues that through the Barents-
cooperation Norway and Russia can align forces in their pursuit for resource exploitation in 
the Arctic: 
 
24 The original Russian version of this document is available on the website of the Russian presidential 
administration: http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/62947  
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“Of course [Norway and Russia] have disagreements, however through the Barents-
cooperation it has become easier to cooperate on subjects where we know there are 
common interests. There is no doubt that both Norway and Russia are actively 
working to create attractive societies in Northern Norway and Northwest Russia. So, 
there are several common issues. For example, some EU countries do not think that oil 
extraction should be sought in the North, but Norway and Russia have a common 
interest in defending it internationally. So, it [the Barents-cooperation] is an important 
tool for that end, in my opinion” (Interview, 07/02) 
In this quote Håvard emphasizes how the Barents-cooperation facilitates and advances 
common regional development ambitions between Russia and Norway. Similar to how the 
informants argue that the cooperation provides government officials with a contact platform 
in times of inter-governmental tension (post-2014), the Barents-cooperation is construed as 
providing Russian and Norwegian politicians with a platform where their common interests in 
oil extraction can be defended. In that way, the Barents-cooperation as represented here by 
Rafaelsen and Håvard, gains its own agency by promoting a specific type of economic and 
industrial cooperation between Norway and Russia. This idea comes with the backdrop of 
another idea, as articulated by mayor Rafaelsen; that more and enhanced industrial 
cooperation across the border strengthens stability and security in the region. As geopolitical 
tension is on the rise, large-scale industrial cooperation facilitated by the Barents-cooperation 
is constructed as a mean for Norway and Russia to secure amicable relations in the 
foreseeable future. The argument articulated here by Rafaelsen and Håvard, can be seen as a 
liberal institution-building approach to peace where none of the participants can risk the loss. 
Or put more precisely, securing an amicable relationship between Norway and Russia due to 
large-scale industrial collaboration in the Arctic region.  
Moreover, the Arctic exploitation-argument should also be put in context with some of the 
social and economic realities in the Barents-region. As Håvard said in the quote above, both 
Norway and Russia have outspoken ambitions of creating attractive societies in their Northern 
and Northwestern regions. Northern-Norway is experiencing a population decline and 
providing more job opportunities is a natural ambition for a regional leader such as Rafaelsen. 
Whereas in Nikel, a Russian industrial town located close to the Norwegian border, Russian 
authorities have decided that the town’s cornerstone industry, a nickel smelter, is closing 
down at the end of 2020 (Staalesen, 2019). This threatens the future of the town whose 
population is highly dependent on the jobs provided by the smelter. In several interviews for 
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this thesis informants spoke of the future of Nikel and its population with worry. Within this 
regional context, Rafaelsen promotes an ambition from which his plan for large-scale 
industrial development is a “savior” of a region in need for more jobs and of economic 
growth. Notwithstanding jobs and economic growth, in Rafaelsen’s perspective large-scale 
industrial development will simultaneously enhance intergovernmental relations between 
Norway and Russia. Thus, Rafaelsen’s plan, facilitated by the Barents-cooperation, is 
represented as something that will secure both economic prosperity and friendly Norwegian-
Russian relations in years to come. 
The practice of reproducing the importance and relevance of the cooperation in relation to 
political tensions and developments is apparent in all four subchapters of this analysis. 
Representing the Barents-cooperation as a facilitator and platform for dialogue is a way in 
which the informants legitimized the cooperation throughout the interviews. Referring back to 
chapter 5.1, the Barents-cooperation is constructed as increasingly important in times of 
geopolitical tension. The arctic exploitation-argument uncovered here which reproduces the 
relevance of the cooperation is a continuation of this. However, in this subchapter the 
representation of the Barents-cooperation as a facilitator for Norwegian-Russian collaboration 
becomes problematic as it is used to promote political ambitions of large-scale oil and gas 
exploitation. Here lies a dilemma as environmental concerns are neglected in the discourse 
uncovered here linking the Barents-cooperation to increasing international interest in the 
Arctic, despite the fact cooperation on environment and sustainable development has been a 
central part of the cooperation since the 1990s. Rather, the Barents-cooperation is, primarily 
by mayor Rafaelsen, discursively represented as an entry-point to talk about the opportunity 
for economic growth. A type of economic growth that comes at the cost of environmental 
concerns.  
While little has come of Norwegian-Russian oil and gas cooperation this far, the Arctic 
exploitation-argument constructed here represents a future vision for both the Barents-region 
and the role of the Barents-cooperation. A link between the Barents-cooperation and large-
scale oil and gas-cooperation is talked into existence by the informants closest to policy-elites. 
In that way, the Arctic exploitation-argument signals how the Barents-cooperation, through 
Rafaelsen and some of the other practitioners I have interviewed, is emerging as an actor with 
its own agency in the Arctic. The cooperation becomes a driver and promotor of a specific 
type of regional development where Russia is construed as an ideal partner. Economic 
opportunities that opens up are seen as grounds for enhanced cooperation with a Russia which 
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is also interested in oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic. In that way, the boundaries of what 
the Barents-cooperation as foreign policy is about and is going to be about in the future are 
being pushed by key regional actors. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have placed the experiences of practitioners in the Barents-cooperation at the 
center of my analysis. I have approached these experiences through a postructuralist discourse 
analysis where I emphasized the constitutive relationship between foreign policy discourses 
and identity construction. I asked: ‘How is the Barents-cooperation discursively represented 
by its Norwegian practitioners, and what identities are thereby constructed?’. The discourse 
analytical perspective has enabled me to uncover discursive dynamics that make out the 
Barents-cooperation. More precisely, I showed how the practitioners represent the 
cooperation, legitimizes it and their own position, assess their own role and their relations to 
other actors, and how they articulate potential threats or challenges. 
In the analysis we have seen how there is a tendency to frame the Barents-cooperation in a 
way that deems it essential whether it pertains to the Norwegian-Russian bilateral relationship 
amid the annexation of Crimea, authoritative turns in Russia, frictions between the Norwegian 
center and periphery, or increased international interest in the Arctic. Amongst the 
practitioners, cooperative practices are expected to continue regardless of interstate tension 
and disagreements at a higher political level. This is the dominant discourse on the Barents-
Cooperation uncovered here: as geopolitical tension is on the rise the cooperation is construed 
as increasingly important, and the informants provide arguments and justifications to maintain 
the status-quo. This dominant discourse reveals that on all activities that fall under the 
umbrella of the BC, the practitioners legitimize and justify the cooperation. This is ongoing, it 
is built into their everyday foreign policy practice, that they justify and develop legitimization 
for their activities. In this way, they give meaning to their own practice, and as we have seen, 
construct identities.  
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, resulted in a change which led to a contentious 
geopolitical climate, a ‘new normal’ with increased tensions. This was apparent in the 
interviews as the annexation of Crimea and subsequent cooling of international relations are 
discussed more as a negative atmosphere surrounding the cooperation than as tangible events 
inflicting upon it. The analysis revealed a tendency to represent the Barents-cooperation as 
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more important because of the geopolitical tensions after 2014. The informants provided a 
series of justifications for the cooperation representing it as a facilitator of dialogue, or “peace 
communication”, and the practitioners own activity as a “soft-security mechanism”. In that 
way, the Barents-cooperation was represented as a counterweight to geopolitical tensions by 
the informants.  
I also showed in the analysis how the informants produced a Norwegian perspective on 
developments in Russian politics whereby the Self was constructed as a supporter of what 
they perceive as a weak and vulnerable Russian civil society. Adopting the role of the 
supporter of someone who is seen as weak and vulnerable can be seen as an additional 
justification and legitimization of the practitioners foreign policy practice and the Barents-
cooperation in general. Through their support to the threatened Russian civil society, the 
informants constructed an idea of Self as representatives of liberal and democratic values. 
This perspective also entailed a discursive representation of the Russian state as the illiberal 
and undemocratic Other. Here, a link between the Barents-cooperation and the world order in 
the cold peace era, as understood by Sakwa (2017), was illustrated. It demonstrated an 
underlying logic embedded in the Self/Other-dynamic where it is the Russian Other who is 
expected to change and transform normatively towards “our” liberal and democratic values.   
Furthermore, reflections and reactions to the Frode Berg-case and Fokus 2020-report revealed 
frictions between the local and the national in Norway as relevant to the Barents-cooperation. 
The informants see their knowledge and understanding of Russia as superior to that of 
Norwegians located south of the Barents-region. They discursively reaffirm their own 
competence as everyday foreign policy practitioners and thereby express opposition to what 
they see as a tendency where the Norwegian government is allowing interstate tension to 
inflict upon the Barents-cooperation. This, they contend, undermines their cooperative 
practice. The local/national friction makes visible the politics in the Barents-cooperation and 
how approaches to Russia are constantly negotiated and balanced between different interests 
and considerations. The informants express understanding for Norway’s pragmatic approach 
towards Russia, however they emphasize a need for their cooperative foreign policy practice 
to remain separated from interstate tension.  
The politics of the Barents-cooperation becomes increasingly visible as it emerges as a 
regional development actor in the Arctic. In a time when international interests in the Arctic is 
increasing, the cooperation is used as a tool to promote regional and local development 
ambitions by the informants closest to policy elites. Descriptions of the cooperation as a 
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facilitator for dialogue and for Norway and Russia to protect common interests in Arctic oil 
and gas exploitation, is the basis on which the cooperation is construed as an additional actor 
in the Arctic representing its own ambitions – and thereby agency. This illustrated a dilemma 
between the Barents-Cooperation as a development actor, as it justifies a particular kind of 
development approach; one in which environmental concerns are sacrificed. This again 
underscored the political character of the Barents-Cooperation, as key actors promote the 
Barents-cooperation as tool for large-scale industrial development collaboration with Russia. 
Finally, by directing focus towards the experiences of practitioners of the Barents-
cooperation, in this thesis I aimed to contribute to the existing literature on Norwegian foreign 
policy towards Russia. While acting out the cooperative practices of the Barents-cooperation 
are done within fields that are described as “politically uncomplicated” by one informant, the 
analysis has shown how talking about the Barents-cooperation is highly political. When 
linking the cooperation to geopolitical tensions, it becomes a tool from which political 
opinions, values, and ambitions are articulated. It uncovers a process where the cooperative 
practice, e.g. the different cross-border cooperation projects, are given meaning and a specific 
purpose as foreign policy practice. Most of the informants are not policy-elites or decisions-
makers, they are nevertheless everyday foreign policy practitioners Therefore, this thesis can 
hopefully contribute to our understanding of how foreign policy practice is not just something 
that is done by politicians or policy-elites. Thus, this thesis reflects a view of foreign policy 
not as only defined by interaction between official state representatives and articulated in 
government white papers. Rather, international relations are influenced by collaboration 
beyond the state-level, where there is articulation of political values, opinions and meanings, 
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8.1 Interview list 
 
Interviewee Date Institution/occupation Location/communication 
medium 
 
Rune Rafaelsen 21st February 
2020 
Mayor of Sør-Varanger Kirkenes  
Thomas Nilsen 14th February 
2020 
Journalist at The 
Independent Barents 
Observer 
Kirkenes   
Håvard*  07th February 
2020, 
15th June 2020 
Several years of 
experience from the 
official Barents-
cooperation institutions 
Skype & E-mail  
Clara*  19th February 
2020, 
15th June 2020 
Several years of 
experience from the 
official Barents-
cooperation 
institutions, Project and 
culture expert  
Kirkenes & E-mail  
Nina*  19th February 
2020 
Theater and culture 
expert 
Kirkenes  
Pål*  28th February 
2020 
Decades of experience 
from cross-border 
education cooperation  
Skype  
Marius* 22nd April 2020 Several years of 




Knut* 8th June 2020 Decades of experience 
from cross-border 
sports cooperation  
Telephone  
Anonymous 1  20th February 
2020 
Business and Industry 
expert 
Kirkenes  
Anonymous 2  3rd March 2020 Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry, with 
experience from the 
Barents-cooperation 
and the region 
Oslo  
Anonymous 3  20th February 
2020 





Anonymous 4  14th of February The Barents Institute Kirkenes  
* = pseudonym 
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Part 1: Introduction • Tell me about your background… How did you 
end up working with/in…?  
• What do you do on a day to day basis in your job 
as…? 
• What is your personal motivation for working 
with cross-border cooperation? 
Part 2: Organization, project and the Barents-
cooperation 
• Tell me about your institution/project: its’ 
history?  
• What are your objectives? Why? And how do 
you go about achieving them? 
• What are some of the challenges you are facing 
in practicing cross-border cooperation? 
• From your experience, how has the Barents-
cooperation/your project/your institution 
developed since you started working there? 
Part 3: Political tension • How do you assess the impact increased 
international (political) tension has had on the 
Barents-cooperation?  
• How has *it* affected your day-to-day activities?  
Wrapping up • How do you envision the future of the Barents-
cooperation (and/or your project)? 
• Is there someone you think I should talk to that 
would benefit my research? 

















8.3 Information letter 
 
This information letter is a translated version (original in Norwegian) of the one I used 
during my field trip to Kirkenes in February 2020. Therefore, it reflects my interest and 
approach to my topic at the time. 
 
Do you want to participate in the research project “The Barents-
cooperation amidst geopolitical tensions”? 
I hereby ask if you would like to participate in a research project where the objective is to gather 
information from people who work with the Barents-cooperation on a daily basis. I am interested in 
the experiences and assessments you make around the cooperation and the geopolitics that surrounds 
it. In this letter I provide information about the aims for the project.  
Purpose 
The project is a master’s thesis in International Relations at the NMBU.  
Thematically this project is geared towards Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia in a time of 
increased tension between the West and the East. I ask how increased tension challenges the 
Norwegian governments balancing act between membership and commitments to NATO on the one 
hand, and a peaceful and amicable relationship and cooperation with Russia on the other hand. 
The purpose is to explore how increased geopolitical tension is experienced by experts and 
practitioners involved in the different projects and institutions of the Barents-cooperation. To that end, 
this research project will do a systematic analysis of how people who work with the cooperation on a 
daily basis experience, reflect, and assess the cooperation in general, its significance to the Norwegian-
Russian relationship, and how geopolitical tensions affect their work.  
In addition to this, I am interested in how different approaches to Norwegian foreign policy towards 
Russia is discussed publicly and amongst people in the Barents-cooperation. Who are the actors that 
discuss this and what are the different perspectives?  
In this research project I want to answer: What is the significance of the Barents-cooperation to 
Norwegian foreign policy? And how is the cooperation affected by geopolitical tensions? 
Why are you asked to participate? 
Possible research participants are based on their current or previously active role in the Barents-
cooperation.  
Who is responsible for this project? 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences is responsible for this project. 
 
